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I.  INTRODUCTION
 The history of moral philosophy can be divided roughly into two 
distinct, warring camps: deontologists and consequentialists. 
Deontologists, or nonconsequentialists, judge the morality of an 
action by assessing its intrinsic worth instead of focusing on the 
consequences of the action.
1
 Perhaps, deontological thought is 
epitomized at its most glorious extreme by this maxim: “Do what 
is right though it results in the demise of the world.”
2
 * Associate Professor, Texas Tech University, School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law 
School, cum laude, 1996; B.A., University of Maryland, summa cum laude, 1992. The 
author would like to acknowledge Professor George P. Fletcher for inspiring this Article 
with his insightful and historic article, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 537 (1972).  
 1. MANUEL VELASQUEZ & VINCENT BARRY, PHILOSOPHY: A TEXT WITH READINGS 316 
(3d ed. 1988). 
 2. This famous proclamation paraphrases an even older Roman maxim, fiat justitia 
ruat caelum, let there be justice though the heavens fall. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1998). Although it is often attributed to Immanuel Kant, 
its origin is unknown.  
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Consequentialists, on the other hand, judge the morality of action by 
evaluating results. Utilitarianism, the dominant consequentialist 
theory, views the morally just act as the one that creates the greatest 
good for the greatest number.
3
 These, of course, are oversimplified 
but useful generalizations.  
 In their purest form, these moral philosophies are like show dogs. 
In the theoretical arena, where their proponents run them through 
their carefully scripted hypotheticals, they seem majestic, confident, 
and perfect. However, removed from their controlled surroundings 
and placed into the world where so many factors collide or are 
unknown, their rigidity too often subjects them to crippling flaws. 
Deontology’s demand to “do what is right” may resonate deeply, but 
there is seldom agreement on what is the right thing to do.
4
Moreover, it is hard to ignore consequences when the heavens really 
might fall.
5
 Similarly, utilitarianism’s focus on maximizing the 
collective welfare seems reasonable until one’s personal welfare is 
sacrificed for the “greater good.”
6
 Under the appropriate 
circumstances, each philosophy is a pleasure to behold, but day-to-
day they demand too much to be ideal companions.  
 The law, on the other hand, is a mutt. While the supporters of 
these conflicting philosophies tend to adhere rigidly to the moral 
superiority of their ethic, the law has bred these philosophies 
together to derive the best qualities of each. The law must function in 
the all too uncertain world where the variables are innumerable, the 
facts often are incomplete or conflicting, and the events and parties 
are real. Individual rights are balanced against the demands of social 
welfare. This balancing can be seen in all fields of law.
7
 In 
constitutional law, the Bill of Rights protects certain fundamental 
rights against the demands of social utility.
8
 Yet even the First 
 3. VELASQUEZ & BARRY, supra note 1.  
 4. Leonard G. Ratner, The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and 
Evolution, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 723, 778 (1984) (arguing that there is no nonutilitarian 
basis for choosing between the various a priori moral standards, the proponents of which 
claim each to be superior to the other).  
 5. This problem perhaps most clearly arises in the application of deontological 
ethics to the targeting of civilian populations as part of our nuclear deterrence policy. See, 
e.g., Paul Ramsey, A Political Ethics Context for Strategic Thinking, in STRATEGIC 
THINKING AND ITS MORAL IMPLICATIONS 101, 134-35 (Morton A. Kaplan ed., 1973); MICHAEL 
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
269-83 (1977).  
 6. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 116-18 (1979) (discussing utilitarianism’s propensity to sacrifice 
innocent persons for social welfare).  
 7. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 
(1989) (providing a detailed discussion of the rise and dominance of consequentialist 
thought in legal jurisprudence and proposing a rights-based approach to choice of law 
analysis to constrain, rather than replace, utilitarian policy-based analysis).  
 8. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) 
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Amendment’s protection of the individual’s right to free speech is 
subject to limitations where a “compelling interest” or “clear and 
present danger” threaten the collective good.
9
 Contract law protects 
the right to have private agreements enforced. This right, however, is 
typically limited to money damages rather than specific performance 
in order to encourage socially desirable contractual breaches that 
maximize economic efficiency.
10
 In property law, restrictive covenants, 
such as those that limit land use to single family dwellings, might be 
unenforceable when contrary to utilitarian demands of public 
policy.
11
 This balancing is so fundamental to all fields that the law 
itself is appropriately symbolized by the scales of justice.  
 Tort law also has been shaped by the struggle to strike a proper 
balance between protecting individual rights and furthering social 
utility.
12
 In his celebrated 1972 Harvard Law Review article, Fairness 
(stating that substantive due process analysis involves balancing the liberty interest of the 
individual “and the demands of organized society”); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 
900 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that the Fourth Amendment prohibition 
against “unreasonable searches and seizures” requires “balanc[ing] the rights of the 
individual with the needs of society”); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND 
THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 223 (1979); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (providing a detailed 
critical analysis of the prevalence of balancing rights with utility in constitutional law and 
a discussion of alternatives). 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) 
(holding that content-based state restrictions on speech “must be narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling Government interest”); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (finding that the First Amendment does not protect speech that creates “a clear and 
present danger [of bringing] about substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent”); 
see also Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive 
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998) (arguing that actual 
constitutional practice reveals that constitutional rights do not typically trump social 
welfare concerns); Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional 
Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785, 797 (1994). 
10. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §12.3 (Aspen 
3d ed. 2004) (discussing the economic theory supporting efficient breach of contract where 
the party in breach gains more from breaching the contract than she would from full 
performance, even after compensating the nonbreaching party for the damages resulting 
from the breach); see also Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750-51 (7th Cir. 
1988) (describing and applying efficient breach of contract theory). 
 11. See, e.g., Crane Neck Ass’n v. N.Y.C./Long Island Cnty. Servs. Grp., 460 N.E.2d 
1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1984). 
 12. See generally Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common 
Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285 (2001) [hereinafter Keating, Theory]
(describing the common law of torts as torn between fault, enterprise liability, and other 
norms like property rights); Edward C. Lyons, Balancing Acts: Intending Good and 
Foreseeing Harm—The Principle of Double Effect in the Law of Negligence, 3 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 453 (2005) (discussing the task of balancing the often antithetical 
considerations of rights and utility in negligence law); M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal 
Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the Lenses of Corrective Justice and 
Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017 (1998) (discussing the balancing of corrective justice and 
economic efficiency goals in proposed products liability reform legislation and the Third 
Restatement’s treatment of warning defects); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of 
Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 434 (1993) 
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and Utility in Tort Theory, Professor George P. Fletcher describes 
this struggle as a “confrontation . . . between two radically different 
paradigms,” one that focuses solely on doing justice between the 
parties, and another that seeks to resolve private disputes in ways 
that best serve the collective good.
13
 Fletcher dubs the rights-based 
fairness model “the paradigm of reciprocity”
14
 and names the competing 
utilitarian model “the paradigm of reasonableness.”
15
 The paradigm 
of reciprocity emphasizes individual autonomy, and the paradigm of 
reasonableness emphasizes efficiency and community welfare. 
 Fletcher’s article is not simply a description of the clash between 
fairness and utility in tort theory; it is fueled by a deep opposition to 
utilitarianism’s propensity to demand individual sacrifice for the 
greater good.
16
 The unfairness of the reasonableness paradigm, 
according to Fletcher, is that it weighs the collective costs and 
benefits of an activity to society as a whole, without regard to the 
disproportionate distribution of the cost to the victim.
17
 The 
reasonableness paradigm allows individuals to be used as the means 
to achieving a socially beneficial end. Fletcher believes that the 
paradigm of reciprocity could serve as a descriptively and morally 
superior unifying theory of torts. While Fletcher’s article has grown 
in fame over the years and continues to be widely read and 
referenced,
18
 his paradigm of reciprocity has not been embraced as a 
unifying theory of tort law. Only rarely has it been applied by the 
[hereinafter Owen, Foundations] (arguing that products liability law cannot, and should 
not, be reduced to a single unifying “metatheory” but instead requires a pluralist analysis 
from a variety of moral perspectives).  
 13. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 
539-40 (1972) [hereinafter Fletcher, Fairness and Utility].
 14. Id. at 540; see also Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacademification of 
Tort Theory, 48 KAN. L. REV. 59, 79 n.162 (1999) (citing Lawrence Vold et al., Aircraft 
Operator’s Liability for Ground Damage and Passenger Injury, 13 NEBR. L. BULL. 373, 380 
(1935); Wex Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 
156-57 (1946) (discussing Lawrence Vold's theory)) (noting that the concept of reciprocity of 
risk as a fundamental basis of tort theory did not originate with Fletcher’s work but was 
widely discussed in prior scholarship in the 1930s and 1940s).  
 15. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 542. 
 16. See id. Fletcher’s application of deontological philosophy to the law is not limited 
to torts theory. In fact, Fletcher is more renowned for his influential and voluminous 
scholarship in the area of criminal law. Regardless of the field of law, a recurring theme in 
much of his work is the search for and commitment to values that are ends in themselves 
rather than seeking rules that will achieve some conception of social welfare. See generally 
George P. Fletcher, In God’s Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1608 (1999); George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275 (1998); George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985); George P. Fletcher, Why Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421 (1987) 
[hereinafter Fletcher, Why Kant].
 17. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 542-43. 
 18. See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 751, 769 (1996) (ranking Fletcher’s Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory as the 
fifty-seventh most cited legal article of all time). 
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courts,
19
 and with a few notable exceptions, it is conspicuously absent 
from products liability scholarship.
20
 Like Howard Hughes’ Spruce 
Goose,
21
 it is admired for its imagination and scope, but no one seems 
confident it will actually fly.
22
 As with torts generally, products liability has also struggled to 
balance individual fairness with social utility.
23
 Since its approval in 
1997, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (Third 
Restatement) has been subject to criticism from both perspectives, but 
the loudest voices have been from those who view the Third 
Restatement as being too industry friendly at the cost of consumers.
24
 This Article subjects the Third Restatement to the same 
contrasting analysis that Fletcher applied to torts generally in order 
to better understand its successes and failures in balancing the 
competing goals of fairness and utility. While Fletcher’s article is 
used as a template, his paradigm of reciprocity proves to be 
unworkable when applied to bargained-for exchanges such as those 
 19. Of the fourteen published opinions that cite Fletcher’s article, only one claims to 
apply notions of reciprocity to the case. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 
662-63 (6th Cir. 1979). The court invoked principles of reciprocity as support for the 
proposition that business entities may take advantage of the benefits of dividing the 
business into parent and subsidiary corporate parts but must in fairness also be treated as 
distinct corporations for purposes of liability and benefits under the workmen's 
compensation statute. See id. While the court cited Fletcher’s Fairness and Utility in Tort 
Theory, the argument is more akin to estoppel than Fletcher’s paradigm of reciprocity. 
 20. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558, 
606 (1985) (criticizing Fletcher’s theory for being normatively unattractive and for failing 
to explain tort “[c]ases involving preexisting relationships, such as nonnegligent 
auto/passenger and doctor/patient injuries”).  
 21. The “Spruce Goose” is the nickname for the massive, 218 foot-long, plywood sea 
plane built by Hughes Aircraft as a prototype transport designed to carry troops and 
supplies across the Atlantic Ocean during WWII. Unfortunately, engineering obstacles and 
budget overruns prevented its completion until 1947. It flew only once, for about one mile 
with Howard Hughes at the controls. Nevertheless, it remains an object of study and 
wonderment and can be viewed at the Evergreen Aviation and Space Museum in 
McMinniville, Oregon.  
 22. See Heidi M. Hurd, Nonreciprocal Risk Imposition, Unjust Enrichment, and the 
Foundations of Tort Law: A Critical Celebration of George Fletcher’s Theory of Tort Law, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 711, 712 (2003) (criticizing Fletcher’s article as “descriptively 
implausible, normatively unattractive, and ultimately conceptually incoherent”). While 
much of her criticism has merit, her basic argument depends upon a more dogmatic 
interpretation of Fletcher’s paradigm of reciprocity than he was suggesting. See also
Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 311, 314-16 (1996) [hereinafter Keating, Reasonableness] (criticizing reciprocity 
theory for its failure to explain the law of due care).  
 23. See Owen, Foundations, supra note 12 (approaching the issues from a variety of 
moral perspectives rather than adopting a single metatheory). 
 24. See generally Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability 
and the Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227 
(1997); Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003); 
Note, Just What You’d Expect: Professor Henderson’s Redesign of Products Liability, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 2366, 2381 (1998); Jerry J. Phillips, Consumer Expectations, 53 S.C. L. REV.
1047 (2002); Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restatement, 
and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889 (2005). 
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that occur between manufacturers and consumers in products 
liability. A modification to that model, herein dubbed the “autonomy 
paradigm,” provides a clearer lens through which to view the 
Third Restatement.
 Part II explains Fletcher’s paradigms of reciprocity and 
reasonableness in detail and highlights the ability of each to provide 
useful but contrasting views of tort law. Part III discusses the 
problems and limitations inherent in the paradigm of reciprocity, 
including its inability to account for bargained-for relationships. Its 
failure to achieve broader application is attributed to its 
unnecessarily narrow conception of liberty and dogmatic disregard 
for the demands of utility. The “autonomy paradigm” is proposed as a 
modification that retains reciprocity’s goal of protecting equal liberty 
but broadens the test of equal freedom to include the express and 
implied consent to risks in exchange for express and implied benefits. 
The autonomy paradigm also makes modest utilitarian concessions 
in order to create a balanced and practical conceptual model that can 
be applied to the full range of tort law.  
 Part IV discusses the evolution of products liability law leading to 
the drafting of the Third Restatement. This discussion forms the 
basis for the ensuing analysis in Part V, which applies the 
contrasting autonomy paradigm and reasonableness paradigm to the 
three primary categories of product defects as described in the Third 
Restatement: manufacturing, warning, and design defects. The 
analysis provides the reader with markedly differing views of the 
same legal landscape. In doing so it reveals that in most respects 
individual fairness and social utility are balanced by and embodied in 
the Third Restatement. This balancing, as in torts generally, is 
achieved through the use of several tests based upon distinct 
concerns rather than the application of a single mega theory of 
liability applied to all cases and claims.  
 Part VI discusses the one area where fairness is unnecessarily 
sacrificed for utility: claims brought by bystanders (strangers to the 
product rather than consumers) injured by dangers inherent in useful 
product design. Finally, it advances several strict liability proposals 
to restore the balance between fairness and utility with regard to 
bystanders injured by dangerous but socially useful product designs.  
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II.  FLETCHER’S PARADIGMS OF RECIPROCITY AND REASONABLENESS
 Fletcher’s article mirrors the conflict between rights-based 
scholarship
25
 and economic scholarship that was raging in torts 
theory at that time.
26
 The two paradigms he describes serve as useful 
contrasting lenses for viewing the body of tort law from distinct 
perspectives. The contrasting view highlights the conflict in tort law 
between fairly treating the parties before the court and furthering 
collective welfare. His analysis enhances our understanding of the 
nature of strict liability and makes us question our fundamental 
assumption regarding the requirement of fault for compensation. But 
Fletcher does not seek to combine or balance the competing demands 
of social utility and individual rights.
27
 He regards the paradigm of 
reciprocity as both normatively and descriptively superior to the 
paradigm of reasonableness.
28
 In the end, however, reciprocity of risks 
proves too slender a reed upon which to support tort law as a whole.  
A.  The Paradigm of Reciprocity 
 As a deontological model, the paradigm of reciprocity must adhere 
to a nonconsequential value that serves as its foundation.
29
 One of 
the historical criticisms of all deontological thought is the subjective 
nature of the fundamental values upon which it is based. Whether 
the source is religion, natural law, or reason, there is no agreement 
on the fundamental values or their origins. To resolve this problem, 




 and many others 
before him, identifies individual autonomy—freedom—as the most 
fundamental right of all persons.
32
 Individual liberty allows each 
 25. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 540. 
 26. See generally George P. Fletcher, Remembering Gary—and Tort Theory, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 279 (2003). In 1972, Professor George P. Fletcher was at the University of 
California School of Law immersed in what he has described as the “headiest hothouse of 
ideas” that he has ever known. Id. at 279. In addition to Fletcher, UCLA School of Law was 
at that time the home of such tort giants as Gary Schwartz, Richard Epstein, and 
philosophers Herbert Morris and Dick Wasserstrom.  
 27. Id. at 285 (“I implicitly favored the paradigm of reciprocity, but I did not then and 
I do not now believe in a synthesis that could resolve the conflict between the thesis of 
reciprocity and the antithesis of reasonableness.”). 
 28. Id.
 29. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550. 
 30. E.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (Harper & 
Row 1964) (1785). At the risk of oversimplifying Kant’s writings, one clear tenet of his work 
is that people should always be treated with respect to their dignity as autonomous beings 
and always as ends in themselves. This principle is central to Fletcher’s paradigm of 
reciprocity. See also Fletcher, Why Kant, supra note 16, at 428 (discussing Kant’s influence 
upon legal thought, in particular, the premise that individual rights “ ‘trump’ the demands 
of utility and efficiency”). 
 31. See e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 32. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550.  
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person to decide what constitutes a good life and what ends, if any, 
are worth pursuing.
33
 The paradigm of reciprocity was heavily influenced by Rawls’ A
Theory of Justice, which was published the previous year.
34
 By 
analogy to Rawls’ first principle of justice, Fletcher’s paradigm of 
reciprocity is premised upon the belief that “all individuals in society 
have the right to roughly the same degree of security from risk.”
35
Under this model, the collective utility of the activities and the 
impact of tort judgments on society are irrelevant.
36
 A defendant is 
liable only for injuries caused by activities that create “risk[s] greater in 
degree and different in order” from the risk created by the plaintiff.
37
 Like Rawls, Fletcher believes that all members of society have the 
right to enjoy the maximum liberty compatible with equal liberty for 
all.
38
 The problem is that all freedom of action creates some risks of 
harm to others. Harm, particularly physical harm, greatly impairs 
one’s freedom. Individual freedom of action is also circumscribed if 
one is prevented from acting whenever the action reduces the 
security of others. Freedom of action must be balanced against the 
right to security from harm. There is no reason, however, to 
circumscribe liberty unless it is incompatible with the equal freedom 
of others. The dilemma is how to balance liberty with security. 
 To balance the conflicting demands of freedom and security, 
Fletcher insists that one needs to focus only on the conduct of the 
parties.
39
 The paradigm of reciprocity is based upon a model of waiver 
or consent.
40
 Fletcher looks at individual conduct to determine the 
level of risk to which that individual has consented.
41
 Fairness 
requires that one waive the right to be secure from risks in equal 
measure to the level of risk one’s own conduct imposes on others.
42
When, however, the plaintiff is injured by a risk greater in degree 
than the risk the plaintiff imposed on the defendant, the plaintiff is 
 33. See John B. Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian 
Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677, 684 (1988) (proposing that autonomy in 
the context of tort law has “an intrinsically valuable condition that involves the right to 
fashion one’s own life plan”). 
 34. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550 n.50 (citing John Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164, 165 (1958) and RAWLS, supra note 31). Rawls’ first 
principle of justice is that “each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an 
equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all.” Id. (quoting 
RAWLS, supra note 31, at 165). 
 35. Id. at 550. 
 36. Id. at 540-41. 
 37. Id. at 542.
 38. See id. at 550.
 39. Id. at 540-41. 
40. Id. at 569. Fletcher does not refer to consent but rather the “strategy of waiver.” Id. 
 41. See id. at 540.
 42. Id. at 569.
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entitled to compensation.
43
 One also consents implicitly to the 
“background” level of risk created by common activities, like normal 
motor vehicle driving, in which everyone necessarily partakes.
44
These risks are, as a class, offsetting reciprocal risks.
45
 Harms that 
result from these reciprocal risks are not compensated because the 
right to be free from these risks is waived by participation in the risk-
creating activity.
46
 Fletcher recognized that “[t]he interests of society may often 
require a disproportionate distribution of risk.”
47
 Yet he believes the 
tort system’s general limitation of remedies to money damages 
sufficiently balances the needs of society with the rights of the 
individual without the need for further protection in the test for 
liability. The paradigm of reciprocity does not criminalize or enjoin 
the socially useful activity but makes the actor pay for injuries that 
result from the unbalanced distribution of risks.
48
B.  The Paradigm of Reasonableness 
 The paradigm of reasonableness emphasizes efficiency and 
community welfare.
49
 In many respects, it resembles the ordinary 
negligence cost-benefit formula
50
 infused with the law and the 
economic principles typified by the scholarship of Richard Posner, 
Guido Calabresi, and Ronald Coase.
51
 Its fundamental premise is 
that tort law should encourage activities that maximize benefits to 
society as a whole.
52
 Reasonableness is determined by comparing the 
costs and benefits of the injury-causing activity to determine if it 
yields a net gain in social utility.
53
 If the activity’s benefits to society 
as a whole outweigh its costs, including any resulting injuries, then 
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
54
 Therefore, a defendant is 
 43. Id. at 542.
44. Id. at 548.
 45. Id. at 548.
 46. Id. at 569 (“The paradigm of reciprocity, on the other hand, is based on a strategy 
of waiver. It takes as its starting point the personal rights of individuals in society to enjoy 
roughly the same degree of security, and appeals to the conduct of the victims themselves 
to determine the scope of the right to equal security.”).  
 47. Id. at 550.
 48. Id. at 569 (Reciprocity “protect[s] individual autonomy by taxing [in the form of 
tort damages], but not prohibiting, socially useful activities.”). 
 49. Id. at 542.
 50. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the 
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B 
is less than L multiplied by P. . . .”). 
 51. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
 52. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 543. 
 53. Id. at 542.
 54. Id.
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liable only for injuries caused by activities that, on balance, create 
more harm than benefits.
55
 The paradigm of reasonableness is perhaps most closely 
associated with the risk-utility formula articulated by Learned Hand 
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. In Carroll Towing, a
negligently operated tugboat caused a barge loaded with government 
flour to break free of its pier and drift into a tanker, whose propeller 
ruptured a hole in the barge bottom, causing the barge to sink.
56
 In 
considering the comparative negligence of the barge owner for failing 
to have a bargee on board who could have utilized pumps to save the 
vessel, Learned Hand articulated his famous formula.
57
 Liability is 
imposed if the burden of adequate precautions (B) is less than the 
gravity of harm (L) multiplied by the probability of harm (P).
58
 So, for 
example, assume that we determine that the precaution of having a 
bargee on board would cost $30,000 a year, while a barge breaks free 
an average of once a year and causes an average of $20,000 in 
damages. In such a case, the defendant would not be liable for failing 
to pay more for a precaution than the cost of the foreseeable harm. 
Although such precise calculations were not possible,
59
 the court 
concluded that the cost of keeping a bargee on board the barge during 
the “haste and bustle” of daylight activity on New York Harbor 
during the full tide of war was less than the foreseeable harm likely 
to result absent this precaution.
60
 Accordingly, as a matter of 
efficiency, the court concluded that the barge operator was 
contributorily negligent for not keeping a bargee on board during 
daylight hours.
61
 55. See id. at 542-43. 
 56. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 171 (1947). 
57. Id. at 173. 
 58. Id. (expressing the formula mathematically as B < PL); see also Posner, supra note 
51, at 32-33. Judge Posner’s explanation of Hand’s formula is now notorious. 
 59. As Judge Learned Hand noted in his opinion subsequent to his famous formula 
from Carroll Towing:
[O]f these factors care is the only one ever susceptible of quantitative estimate, 
and often that is not. The injuries are always a variable within limits, which do 
not admit of even approximate ascertainment; and, although probability might 
theoretically be estimated, if any statistics were available, they never are; and, 
besides, probability varies with the severity of the injuries. It follows that all such 
attempts are illusory, and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention 
upon which one of the factors may be determinative in any given situation.  
Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 60. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 174. 
 61. See id.
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C.  The Paradigms Applied to Strict Liability, Negligence, and 
Intentional Torts 
 Fletcher maintains that the contracting paradigm of reciprocity is 
a descriptively superior model capable of unifying the seemingly 
diverse categories of strict liability, intentional torts, and negligence, 
while the paradigm of reasonableness can account only for some 
negligence claims.
62
 For example, the paradigm of reciprocity 
accounts for the imposition of strict liability for ultrahazardous 
activities like blasting, fumigating, and crop dusting because these 
activities create risks greater in degree and different in order 
(nonreciprocal) compared to the risks of ordinary activities.
63
 Under 
this model it is irrelevant that these ultrahazardous activities are 
socially beneficial or that the risks are justifiable from a utility-
maximizing perspective.
64
 The sole focus is on the level of risk created 
by the defendant and the plaintiff. Thus, when a construction 
company’s stock of explosives accidentally detonates and the 
concussion injures an adjacent homeowner, liability is imposed 
despite the social utility and the exercise of reasonable care.
65
 The 
risk to the adjacent homeowner created by the use and storage of 
explosives, while justifiable, is greater than the risks the homeowner 
imposes on the construction company. The socially beneficial activity 
is not criminalized or enjoined, but the individual’s loss is 
compensated.
66
 On the other hand, the paradigm of reasonableness 
cannot account for the imposition of strict liability because even the 
high degree of risk associated with these activities can be justified by 
the tremendous collective benefits they provide.  
 When applied to negligence claims, Fletcher’s two paradigms often 
result in similar outcomes, but the tests employed and the factors 
considered are philosophically distinct. For example, an automobile 
accident between two drivers, each following the rules of the road, 
would result in no liability under either paradigm.
67
 Both drivers 
impose similar reciprocal risks to the other, and normal driving is 
socially beneficial, reasonable, and efficient despite the harms that 
result.
68
 In contrast, when one driver weaves in and out of traffic at 
seventy miles per hour, while the other remains in her lane, traveling 
 62. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 540-50. 
 63. Id. at 547. 
 64. Id. at 540-41. 
 65. See generally Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 511 (1931) 
(Plaintiff’s home and business were damaged, and she was thrown from her bed and 
injured when defendant’s store of dynamite used in connection with a hydroelectric 
development suddenly exploded).  
 66. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550-51. 
 67. Id. at 543. 
 68. Id.
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at the posted speed limit of forty miles per hour, the speeding driver 
creates a nonreciprocal risk compared to the other. If their collision 
results in an injury proximately caused by the speeding driver, she 
will be held liable. The reasonableness paradigm also imposes 
liability, but the rationale is that the modest increase in utility that 
results from speeding is significantly outweighed by the increased 
risk of harm.  
 Similarly, Fletcher maintains that intentional torts like assault 
and battery are aptly explained by the paradigm of reciprocity.
69
 If a 
defendant acts with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, or 
knows such a contact is substantially certain to result, the ensuing 
risk is of a degree and kind entirely distinct from the background of 
risks one normally accepts as part of one’s participation in society.
70
The reasonableness paradigm also imposes liability for many 
intentional torts as long as they do not result in greater social utility.  
D.  The Unfairness of the Paradigm of Reasonableness 
 Although Fletcher believes the paradigm of reciprocity is 
descriptively superior to the reasonableness paradigm, it is his moral 
aversion to the paradigm of reasonableness’s propensity to sacrifice 
the “individual to the demands of maximizing utility” that drives him 
to embrace the alternative paradigm of reciprocity.
71
 Under the 
reasonableness paradigm, where the injury-causing activity has 
sufficient social utility, compensation is denied regardless of the 
nonreciprocal nature of the risks imposed. Fletcher cites several 
examples illustrating this problem: the streetcar company that 
knows its trains will occasionally jump the track; the police officer 
who injures a bystander while shooting at a fleeing felon; and the 
logger who floats logs downriver despite his knowledge that the 
activity might cause flood damage to downstream crops.
72
 In each 
instance, the utility of the injury-causing activity might result in the 
plaintiff receiving no compensation for his injury under the paradigm 
of reasonableness. Under the paradigm of reciprocity, instead of 
being sacrificed, persons injured by these activities would be 
compensated because of the nonreciprocal nature of the risk imposed.
73
 A hypothetical variation of the facts in United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co. highlights the normative objection to the paradigm of 
reasonableness. Imagine that the plaintiff saves a little each week in 
order to purchase a $20,000 powerboat that he keeps tied to a marina 
 69. Id. at 550. 
 70. Id. Curiously, Fletcher describes battery as “a rapid acceleration of risk, directed 
at a specific victim.” Id.
 71. Id. at 573. 
 72. Id. at 563. 
 73. Id. at 550-51. 
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pier when not in use. The defendant’s barge becomes unmoored and 
drifts into the plaintiff’s boat, sending it to the bottom of New York 
Harbor. Assume that the court is able to determine with perfect 
prescience that the cost of employing sufficient bargees would be 
$30,000 annually and that a barge will break free of its mooring once 
a year and cause an average of $20,000 in damages to other vessels 
or structures. Under the reasonableness paradigm, the burden of 
taking adequate precautions would be greater than the probability of 
harm multiplied by the gravity of the injury, resulting in no 
negligence and no liability. From a utilitarian and efficiency 
perspective, it is not reasonable to spend $30,000 in order to prevent 
$20,000 in losses.  
 Conversely, from a fairness perspective, the imposition of liability 
under the same facts is required. Utilitarian concerns might well 
dictate that the defendant not be criminally sanctioned, enjoined, or 
compelled to spend $30,000 to prevent the $20,000 loss. 
Nevertheless, it seems unfair that the plaintiff should suffer a loss of 
$20,000 in order to save the defendant $30,000. The reciprocity 
paradigm leaves the defendant free to choose the more efficient method 
of conducting his business but requires that he pay the less expensive 
damages caused by the nonreciprocal risks created by his choice. 
Hence, the defendant’s choice would be between $30,000 for prevention 
or $20,000 in damages, not $30,000 in prevention or nothing.  
 It is strange that tort law regards it as reasonable to leave the 
innocent victims of welfare-maximizing activities uncompensated,
74
while criminal law regards the sacrifice of morally innocent 
individuals for the good of society as unjust.
75
 In criminal law, 
innocent persons are not to be punished for crimes they did not 
commit—even if it can be justified by application of utilitarian 
calculations—because innocent persons have a moral right to have 
their autonomy respected and not be treated as a means to an end.
76
 74. See id. at 567. 
 75. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a 
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free.”); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*352 (“[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”); Alexander 
Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (discussing the historical foundations 
and rationale for Blackstone’s famous ten-to-one ratio).  
 76. See E.F. CARRITT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (Greenwood Press 1973) 
(1947) (Illustrating the potential for utilitarian principles to justify punishment of the 
innocent: “[I]f some kind of very cruel crime becomes common, and none of the criminals 
can be caught, it might be highly expedient, as an example, to hang an innocent man, if a 
charge against him could be so framed that he were universally thought guilty; indeed this 
would only fail to be an ideal instance of utilitarian ‘punishment’ because the victim 
himself would not have been so likely as a real felon to commit such a crime in the future; 
in all other respects it would be perfectly deterrent and therefore felicific.”); see also Ronald 
J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation 
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Yet if the imposition of criminal sanctions on morally innocent 
defendants is deemed an unfair imposition on individual rights, then 
the uncompensated imposition of harm on innocent victims of socially 
useful activities also must be judged as an unfair, though perhaps 
less severe, imposition on individual rights.
77
 Indeed, in some circumstances, the paradigm of reasonableness 
would not compensate victims of even intentional harms as long as 
the act results in a net social utility. While Fletcher never discusses 
this aspect of the paradigm of reasonableness, the theoretical 
potential is illustrated by a variation of the classic trolley dilemma 
articulated by philosopher Judith Jarvis Thompson.
78
 A trolley is 
moving down the track towards five people who, for purposes of the 
hypothetical, are unaware of its approach and cannot be warned of 
the danger. However, one can save these five people by pushing a 
large man in front of the trolley, thereby stopping it before it reaches 
the other five persons on the track.
79
 The reasonableness paradigm 
would not impose liability because the cost of one life is justified in 
order to prevent the loss of five lives. If the unrealities of the problem 
are set aside, the dilemma highlights the potential of utilitarian 
thought to sacrifice individuals for the collective good.
80
 The 
paradigm of reciprocity, on the other hand, would compel liability for 
Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 324 n.93 (1990) (“If a judge were actually to 
follow a utilitarian theory of punishment, the judge might be required to punish a 
defendant who was widely believed to be guilty, even if the judge knew the defendant to be 
innocent.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory 
and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 320 n.11 (1984). But see Guyora 
Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 
RUTGERS L.J. 115, 118-19 (2000) (insisting that claims that utilitarianism could support 
the framing of the innocent are based upon a misapplication of an act-utilitarian ethic of 
individual behavior to the institutions and process necessarily central to utilitarian 
penology). Binder and Smith, however, do not appear to directly refute Carritt’s 
hypothetical, but rather dispute the conclusions of the hypothetical when applied to 
institutions with a uniform, utility-maximizing process. Id. at 133-35.  
 77. To highlight the injustice that can result from an exclusive focus on collective 
welfare, Fletcher draws an analogy between the paradigm of reasonableness in tort cases 
and strict liability in criminal cases. In Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 
(1844), the court upheld a bigamy conviction against a woman who sincerely, but 
incorrectly, believed her first husband was dead. Id. at 473. While the court acknowledged 
that Mrs. Mash was not blameworthy for her mistake, the conviction was justified by the 
need to deter bigamy for the sake of social order. Id. The morally innocent suffers for the 
collective good. The reader will be relieved to learn that Mrs. Mash was pardoned by the 
Governor before she was sentenced. Id. at 475. 
 78. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 
MONIST 204 (1976). 
 79. Id. at 206.
 80. But see Ratner, supra note 4, at 752 (suggesting that the “monstrous” potential of 
utilitarian theory is eliminated by the incorporation of sociobiological evolution principles 
because monstrous conduct is inconsistent with “long-run human survival”).  
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imposing this nonreciprocal risk on the unfortunately placed large 
man despite the utility of sacrificing him.
81
 Fletcher recognizes that utilitarian concerns demand that certain 
socially beneficial activities be permitted despite the resulting 
nonreciprocal risks.
82
 The problem with the paradigm of 
reasonableness is that it seeks to determine whether the defendant 
should have engaged in the harm-causing activity instead of another 
course of conduct, rather than determining if, in fairness, the 
plaintiff should be compensated for his loss.
83
 An exclusive focus on 
the utilitarian calculus might be appropriate if a finding of liability in 
ordinary tort claims resulted in the prohibition or criminalization of 
conduct that maximizes the collective welfare of society.
84
 Of course, 
tort liability does not result in criminal sanctions, and injunctive 
relief is not available except under a few unique circumstances.
85
Rather, a finding of liability results in the defendant compensating 
the plaintiff for the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct. 
Enterprise liability theory dispels concerns that imposing 
compensatory damages will have dire consequences on utility.
86
 If the 
defendant’s conduct is efficient, it still costs less to compensate the 
plaintiff than it would cost to implement safer practices.
87
 Moreover, 
if no harm results from the defendant’s nonreciprocal risk-creating 
activity, tort law is not implicated.
88
The paradigm of reciprocity’s requirement that those engaged in 
socially useful activities should nonetheless pay for the harms they 
 81. I suspect Fletcher would insist that the large man cannot be sacrificed to save 
the others. 
 82. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550. 
 83. See id. at 556-57. 
 84. See id. at 568. 
 85. Injunctive relief is generally available only in instances of ongoing intentional 
torts and nuisance claims. See Walsh v. Johnston, 608 A.2d 776 (Me. 1992) (describing an 
injunction requiring removal of a portion of cottage encroaching on the owner’s land). Even 
when a nuisance is established, injunctive relief may be denied if the activity is socially 
useful and the nuisance cannot be abated without effectively closing the defendant’s 
business or rendering it economically unfeasible. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 
N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (ordering damages rather than injunctive relief where the 
defendant’s cement plant produced dust that interfered with the use and enjoyment of 
nearby homes where the loss recoverable was small in comparison with the cost of removal 
of the nuisance).  
 86. See, e.g., Keating, Theory, supra note 12 (explaining the rationales for enterprise 
liability and criticizing the Restatement (Third) of Torts’ implicit claim that strict liability 
is not a general theory of responsibility for accidental physical injury).  
 87. Id.
 88. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (awarding nominal 
damages for denial of speech rights); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1207-08 & 
n.100 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that damages could be “inferred” from violation of 
substantive right to be free from unlawful search), aff’d in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). At 
least with regard to negligence claims, harm is an essential element of the claim. General 
harm is required in other tort actions although it is sometimes presumed with regard to 
dignitary torts or is not subject to quantification.  
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cause is instantly recognizable to those familiar with products 
liability theory. Strict products liability is justified, at least in part, 
by the notion that product manufacturers should spread the costs of 
the harms their products cause among those who benefit from the 
use of their products.
89
 Yet Fletcher’s reciprocity theory is 
conspicuously absent from the bulk of products liability theory.
90
 In 
order to understand why the paradigm of reciprocity has not had a 
wider practical impact on tort law and on products liability in 
particular, it is necessary to expose its limitations and revise the 
model to make it applicable to products liability. The goal is to retain 
reciprocity’s focus on individual fairness while creating a more 
comprehensive and balanced model that can be effectively applied by 
the courts.  
III.  PROBLEMS WITH AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE PARADIGM OF 
RECIPROCITY TEST
 Two problems with the paradigm of reciprocity have hampered its 
real world applications. First, Fletcher’s paradigm of reciprocity fails 
to serve as a comprehensive theory of tort law because it focuses 
exclusively on individual autonomy and fails to sufficiently balance 
the needs of society. Second, while purporting to be based upon a 
waiver of security or consent to risk, the test measures consent only 
by risk creation. This test ignores all other express and implicit 
exchanges of security for freedom. As a result, the reciprocity 
paradigm proves unworkable, unfair, and overly simplistic when 
applied to the innumerable real world interactions in which members 
of a complex society expressly or impliedly consent to nonreciprocal 
risks in exchange for some other perceived benefit.  
A.  The Utility of Background Risks 
 Fletcher acknowledges that the paradigm of reciprocity leaves 
unresolved certain problems he considers to be at the “fringes” of tort 
law.
91
 But these problems arise at the heart of many tort disputes, 
 89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998) 
(“Finally, many believe that consumers who benefit from products without suffering harm 
should share, through increases in the prices charged for those products, the burden of 
unavoidable injury costs that result from manufacturing defects.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965) (“On whatever theory . . . public policy demands 
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be 
placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production . . . .”); see also 
Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1295 (discussing the rationales for enterprise liability); 
John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of 
Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1976). 
 90. Keating, Reasonableness, supra note 22, at 314 (noting that reciprocity theory has 
not been applied to products liability).  
 91. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 549 n.46. 
2011] FAIRNESS AND UTILITY IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY 613
rather than at the periphery. Suppose, for example, a motorist 
injures a pedestrian. Assuming the pedestrian is also a motorist some 
of the time, even if not at the time of injury, how does the paradigm 
of reciprocity resolve the pedestrian’s claim? In other words, must the 
risks be simultaneous, or can reciprocal risks offset each other as 
long as both parties participate in the activity, albeit at different 
times? The problems become more complex where the injured party 
never participates in the activity that caused his injury. What if a 
pedestrian who never drives or rides in motor vehicles is injured by 
the driver of a motor vehicle? Does everyone have to engage in the 
activity for the risks to be deemed reciprocal or just most of society?
92
Fletcher calls this the problem of “protecting minorities.”
93
 In order to resolve these problem cases, individual freedom must 
be balanced with social utility. A solution is suggested by Fletcher’s 
discussion of the “background risks” of common activities that 
generally impose reciprocal risks on all as a cost of community 
living.
94
 These background risks of community living are, of course, a 
reflection of the utilitarian decisions that are made either through 
custom or positive law.
95
 Normal driving includes calculations about 
what speeds are reasonable, despite the risks, because of the utility. 
There certainly would be more security if everyone drove at slower 
speeds, but there would be a concomitant loss of utility and liberty.
96
Rather than honor the wishes of those who choose not to participate 
or who may have opted for safer but less efficient rules of the road, 
the background risks of common activities, like the risk associated 
with what might be described as reasonable driving, must be imposed 
on all persons. The fairness of exposing others to background risks 
seems justified by the direct benefits the nonparticipants receive 
from these background risks.
97
 Indeed, a common understanding of 
fair and just interactions with others is largely based upon an innate 
 92. See id. at 572. 
 93. Id.
 94. Id. at 543. Fletcher does not resolve these problems but does describe certain 
common activities, such as ordinary driving, as background risks that we may be expected 
to bear without compensation. Id.
 95. See id. Fletcher never acknowledges the utilitarian calculus that has led to 
common activities or the customs and rules we regard as ordinary driving.  
 96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998) 
(“Society does not benefit from products that are excessively safe—for example, 
automobiles designed with maximum speeds of 20 miles per hour—any more than it 
benefits from products that are too risky.”).  
 97. Of course, after a risk results in harm to the plaintiff, it might seem that the harm 
outweighs the benefits the plaintiff received from the background activity that harmed the 
plaintiff. However, it is equally true with regard to harms resulting from reciprocal risks. 
To continue the analogy to John Rawls’ theory of justice, we must view the exchange from 
behind a “veil of ignorance.” RAWLS, supra note 31, at 136-42. From this original position 
behind a veil of ignorance, it seems fair to let the harm stay where it fell as long as there 
was a fair exchange of risks and benefits.   
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understanding of a balanced, reciprocal exchange. Imposing 
background risks of common activities on all members of society as a 
concession to the reality of community living and utility is necessary 
to make a workable system.
98
 Without this balance of fairness and 
utility, no model is practical.  
B.  Bargained-for Relationships 
 Fletcher also conceded that the paradigm of reciprocity could not 





 and most significant for our 
purposes, products liability.
101
 Fletcher believed these claims raised 
special problems because of the consensual, bargained-for nature of 
the relationships.
102
 The problem of applying Fletcher’s nonreciprocal 
risk test directly to products liability is readily apparent. All products 
create some risks for the consumer while the consumer typically 
imposes no reciprocal risks upon the product manufacturer.
103
 Direct 
application would result in the imposition of liability whenever the 
user was injured by a product risk. Yet, at its philosophical epicenter, 
the paradigm of reciprocity’s basic notions of freedom and autonomy 
are also found at the heart of contract law generally.
104
 Therefore, it 
is odd that Fletcher adopted a test that failed to account for 
bargained-for exchanges.  
 The brilliance of the paradigm of reciprocity is its ability to apply 
notions of consent and autonomy to wide-ranging activities, often 
involving complete strangers. Reciprocity of risk supplies the means 
to measure the default degree of security to which one is entitled in 
the absence of expressed waiver or consent. Reciprocal risks are 
implicitly accepted as a proxy for actual consent. But the test fails to 
account for express or implied consent to risk in exchange for benefits, 
other than the freedom to impose similar risks on others. The paradigm 
of reciprocity must be modified to rectify this inherent weakness.  
 98. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 543. 
 99. See id. at 548 n.43. 
 100. Id.
 101. Id. at 544 n.24. 
 102. Id. (discussing the market relationship between the manufacturer and consumer); 
Id. at 548 n.43 (discussing negligence and the “liability of physicians to patients and 
occupiers of land to persons injured on the premises”). 
 103. At least no risk distinct from those that users impose upon others generally. 
 104. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, §1.7; Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches 
to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 829-33 (1983) (discussing, from a critical legal 
studies perspective, the classic contract theory and its continuing influence on modern 
contract law).  
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C.  Autonomy Not Reciprocity 
 The modification proposed here is referred to as the autonomy 
paradigm. It applies a more comprehensive conception of individual 
liberty, including consent to nonreciprocal risks in exchange for 
benefits, as well as implicit consent to background risks of common 
activities. This modification allows the autonomy paradigm to 
explain bargained-for relationships that the paradigm of reciprocity 
could not. In the case of medical treatment, the patient consents to 
nonreciprocal risks created by the medical procedure in exchange for 
the health benefits of the procedure.
105
 In premises liability, the 
licensee, when properly informed of the risks, consents to them in 
exchange for permission to enter for his own purposes.
106
 In products 
liability, the consumer accepts certain risks of the product in 
exchange for the product’s benefits.
107
 The nature of the benefits 
depends on the tastes and motivations of the individual. Regardless 
of the form of the benefits, when the individual can be said to have 
consented to the risks of the product in return for the benefits of the 
product, the exchange is fair and balanced, even if the risks imposed 
are unilateral. The autonomy paradigm’s broad view of consent 
allows it to serve as a useful model for resolving bargained-for 
exchanges, including product liability claims.  
IV.  PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE HISTORICAL ROUTE TO THE              
THIRD RESTATEMENT
The historical development of products liability law, in particular 
its evolution from contract to tort, is critical to understanding the 
current state of the law. The evolution and merger of tort and 
contract law in products liability was motivated by a desire to 
achieve a balance between fairness and utility.
108
 Much of this 
struggle for fairness has involved an effort to overcome the 
contractual requirement of privity between the plaintiff and 
defendant.
109
 When the conceptual “shackles of privity”
110
 were finally 
 105. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 78-79 (N.J. 2002) 
(following the practice in most jurisdictions of treating cases of informed consent or failure 
to warn as sounding in negligence); Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 
2002) (treating both nonconsensual surgery and lack of informed consent cases as sounding 
in battery); cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing 
“that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical” care). 
106. See, e.g., Houin v. Burger, 590 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that a 
“landowner also has a duty to warn a licensee of any latent danger on the premises of 
which the landowner has knowledge”). 
 107. See Owen, Foundations, supra note 12, at 429-30. 
 108. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 799-800 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall]. 
 109. See id.
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cast off with the adoption of strict liability, the status of the plaintiff 
was treated as irrelevant and the focus shifted exclusively to the 
product.
111
 While this “equal” treatment was an improvement, it 
ignored the important distinction between consumers and bystanders 
that continues to this day. To understand the inequity that results 
from this uniform treatment, we must begin at the beginning.  
A.  The Privity of Contract Requirement 
 Products liability law, born of contract principles, was limited for 
years by its inability to see beyond the parameters of the express 
agreement. Well into the twentieth century, the doctrine of caveat
emptor
112
 protected the manufacturer from liability when, in the 
absence of fraud, the buyer had the opportunity to inspect the 
goods.
113
 This was true even with regard to latent defects, likely to go 
undiscovered by the buyer upon reasonable inspection.
114
 Assuming 
equal bargaining power, the doctrine was not regarded as unjust 
because the buyer, in theory, could require that the seller expressly 
warrant the quality of the product.
115
 The problem is that the theory depends upon assumptions that 
are not mirrored by reality.
116
 This contract conception of product 
liability developed in a simpler time when the manufacturers of 
goods met “face to face on an equal bargaining plane”
117
 with the 
purchasers. The goods were often uncomplicated items, perhaps even 
custom made to the buyer’s specifications, and the buyer was able to 
 110. Id. at 799. Prosser, as was his way, colorfully described the extension of express 
and implied warranties to the buyer’s family and guests in the home by U.C.C. § 2-318 as 
loosening the “shackles of privity to some small extent.” Id.
 111. Both the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A requirement of a defect and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability reasonable alternative design (RAD) 
requirement put the emphasis on the product rather than the relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant.  
 112. “Let the buyer beware.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990). 
 113. See Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388-89 (1870); Tampa Shipbuilding & Eng’g 
Co. v. Gen. Const. Co., 43 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1930).  
 114. See Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. 48, 52-53 (N.Y. 1804). Plaintiff purchased wood sold as 
brazilletto wood, which is quite valuable, when in fact the wood was another variety of 
little value. Id.
 115. See Barnard, 77 U.S. at 388-89 (“No principle of the common law has been better 
established, or more often affirmed, both in this country and in England, than that in sales 
of personal property, in the absence of express warranty, where the buyer has an 
opportunity to inspect the commodity, and the seller is guilty of no fraud, and is neither the 
manufacturer nor grower of the article he sells, the maxim of caveat emptor applies. 
Such a rule, requiring the purchaser to take care of his own interests, has been found best 
adapted to the wants of trade in the business transactions of life. And there is no hardship 
in it, because if the purchaser distrusts his judgment he can require of the seller a 
warranty that the quality or condition of the goods he desires to buy corresponds with the 
sample exhibited.”).  
 116. See Feinman, supra note 104 (discussing the defects of classic freedom-of-
contract theory). 
 117. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80 (N.J. 1960). 
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meaningfully inspect the product.
118
 As products became more 
complex and manufacturers utilized mass production, mass 
marketing, and retail distributors, the contractual model failed to 
reflect the real world practices in which buyers lack the opportunity 
and expertise to inspect the products or negotiate for an express 
warranty.
119
 This change required a shift from contract law, where 
the duty is determined by the parties’ express agreement, to tort law, 
where duty is determined by foreseeability of harm.
120
 In recognition of these new realities, caveat emptor was gradually 
replaced by caveat venditor.
121
 Implied warranties, described by 
Professor William Prosser as “freak hybrid[s] born of the illicit 
intercourse of tort and contract,” imposed upon sellers, as a matter of 
law, the obligation to warrant that their products were free from 
defects, known or unknown, and that they were fit for their ordinary 
and intended uses.
122
 The rationale for these implied warranties was 
that the purchaser pays a fair price “in expectation of an adequate 
advantage, or recompense” in the form of a product free of defects.
123
 Historically, the requirement of privity applied both vertically, 
preventing claims against manufacturers by remote purchasers, 
and horizontally, preventing claims by users of products that were 
not purchasers. The requirement of privity was originally justified 
on the basis that the agreement cannot logically extend beyond 
those who are a party to the agreement.
124
 This strict contractual 
limitation on liability became increasingly at odds with the way 
products are actually bought and sold.
125
 Even as implied 
warranties evolved to reflect the realities of mass produced, complex 
products and retail distributors positioned between manufacturers 
 118. Id.
 119. See id. at 80-83. 
 120. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts,
53 AM. L. REG. 337, 353 (1905) (providing an insightful, detailed, and early discussion of 
the need for a complete change from contract to tort-based liability of manufacturers and 
seller for injuries resulting from products). 
 121. “Let the seller beware.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990). 
 122. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 108, at 800. 
 123. Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (S.C. 1976) (quoting Champneys 
v. Johnson, 3 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 268, 272 (1809)). 
 124. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); Note, Strict Products 
Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916, 923 (1964) (“In warranty, on the other 
hand, privity—i.e., the existence of a direct contractual relationship—was a conceptual 
necessity because the seller’s modern obligations for defective products developed as a part 
of the law of contracts.”). 
 125. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 108, at 792-93 (discussing Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) and focusing on modern product distribution and 
marketing as central to the abandonment of the privity requirement in product liability).  
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and the ultimate consumer of products, the requirement of privity of 
contract remained.
126
 The privity requirement was also clearly at odds with tort law’s 
focus on foreseeability of harm as the linchpin of liability.
127
Nevertheless, the privity requirement was applied to negligence 
claims as well as warranty claims.
128
 In addition to the contract-
based benefit of the bargain rationale, the privity requirement was 
justified as necessary to promote the development of industry and 
thus further utilitarian goals. As one court explained: 
If a . . . manufacturer who constructs a boiler, piece of machinery, 
or a steam-ship, owes a duty to the whole world, that his work or 
his machine or his steam-ship shall contain no hidden defect, it is 
difficult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and no prudent 
man would engage in such occupations upon such conditions. It is 
safer and wiser to confine such liabilities to the parties 
immediately concerned.
129
Reasonable minds might dispute the conclusion that the greatest 
good for the greatest number is maximized by the policy of promoting 
industry at the cost of the injured party. Yet it is the utilitarian 
calculus that permits the debate.  
 Over time, the citadel of privity was progressively riddled with 
exceptions and ultimately fell under the onslaught.
130
 Early 
exceptions, premised on the tort concept of foreseeability of harm, 
were limited to the sale of “imminently” or “inherently” dangerous 
products like poisons, drugs, guns, explosives, and foodstuffs.
131
 In 
the seminal case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Judge Cardozo 
expanded the exception to all negligence claims where the 
manufacturer foresees danger to persons other than the purchaser.
132
Of course, the plaintiff still had to prove negligence on the part of the 
 126. Id.; DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 4.5 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY].
 127. See Bohlen, supra note 120, at 353-55 (“The duty is not one created by the contract 
of sale and so restricted to those party thereto, but is a legal incident to the vendor’s 
previous position as manufacturer, a position voluntarily assumed for his own profit, and 
so extends to all whose safety must depend on his care in manufacture. . . . To encourage 
commerce and industry by removing all duty and incentive to protect the public is to invite 
wholesale sacrifice of individual rights on the altar of commercial greed.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 cmt. b (1965) (stating that a manufacturer’s liability in 
negligence rests “upon the foreseeability of harm if proper care is not used”). 
 128. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Heine, 128 F.2d 657, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1942); see 
also Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 938-40 (Me. 1982) (in which Maine became 
the last state to abandon the privity requirement in negligence-based product liability actions). 
 129. Curtin v. Somerset, 21 A. 244, 245 (Pa. 1891). 
 130. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 108, at 793 (discussing the history of the privity 
requirement in product liability and its progressive exceptions culminating in its 
complete abandonment). 
 131. See id.; OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 2.1. 
 132. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
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manufacturer. The privity requirement remained, however, with 
regard to contract-based express and implied warranty cases.
133
B.  Strict Liability in Tort 
Rather than eliminate the privity requirement in contract-based 
warranty claims, Dean William Prosser advanced a variety of 
arguments supporting the imposition of strict liability in tort for 
injuries caused by defective products. These rationales were applied 
by Justice Roger Traynor in his famous concurring opinion in Escola 
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., upholding a verdict for a waitress injured 
by a defective Coke bottle that exploded.
134
 Almost twenty years later, 
Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court in Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc., affirmed a verdict for a power tool user injured 
when the tool vibrated loose allowing a piece of wood he was working 
on to fly out and strike him on the head.
135
 In so doing, the court 
rejected the defendant’s warranty-based defenses, holding that 
liability is not dependent upon the law of contract but is imposed by 
the law of strict liability in tort.
136
 The rationale for the imposition of strict liability in tort, in 
particular enterprise liability, consists of a mixture of fairness and 
utilitarian concerns. Inasmuch as the sellers seek to encourage 
consumers to trust in their product’s safety and fitness for ordinary 
and foreseeable uses, fairness demands that they should stand 
behind their products when the consumers’ expectations are 
disappointed and they are injured by product defects.
137
 Consumers 
must rely upon manufacturers to evaluate the product’s safety prior 
to sale because consumers are not capable of performing independent 
evaluations of modern complex products.
138
 Finally, those that benefit 
from the risks of the product (i.e., manufacturers, sellers, and 
consumers) should absorb the cost of injuries rather than the injured 
party alone.
139
 However, much of the strict liability scholarship and relevant 
cases focus upon instrumentalist concerns.
140
 Manufacturers are in 
 133. In fact, in some jurisdictions, the privity requirement remains. 
 134. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring). 
 135. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 898-99, 902 (Cal. 1963). 
 136. Id. at 900-01.  
 137. Id. at 901; OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 5.4.
 138. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901; Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1298-99 (discussing 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.).
 139. Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1286. 
 140. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500-07 (1961); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive 
Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985) (discussing 
economic efficiency rationales supporting the development of products liability law); 
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the best position to insure against the risk of product injury and 
distribute these costs to the consuming public as a cost of 
production.
141
 Enterprise liability forces manufacturers to internalize 
the cost of accidents caused by defective products and thereby creates 
incentives for the manufacturer to improve product safety.
142
 In this 
way, the cost-benefit analysis is evaluated automatically by the 
market, and efficiency is achieved.
143
 Efficiency is further enhanced 
by allowing an injured plaintiff to seek compensation directly from 
manufacturers rather than retail sellers. Under warranty law, 
plaintiffs would seek recovery from the retailer and the retailer 
would seek contribution and indemnification from manufacturers for 
damages paid to injured purchasers.
144
 This circuitous path, often 
involving successive suits, wasted judicial resources, created the 
potential for inconsistent verdicts, and increased transaction costs.
145
 These instrumentalist and fairness rationales were both key to 
the American Law Institute’s approval of § 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts in 1966 (Second Restatement).
146
 Section 402A 
imposes strict liability on the seller of products to the user or 
consumer under the following circumstances: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, 
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although  
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product, and 
George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301 
(1989) [hereinafter Priest, Strict].
 141. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 5.4; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Products 
Liability in the Conflict of Laws—Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under 
“Foreseeable and Insurable Laws”: II, 69 YALE L.J. 794 (1960) (analyzing the effect of the 
insurance and risk distribution rationales of enterprise liability to conflict of law issues).  
 142. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 1944); 
Calabresi, supra note 140, at 502 (As Professor Calabresi explains, in theory, this also 
enhances autonomy by allowing the consumer to “cast an informed vote in making his 
purchases.”); George L. Priest, The Modern Transformation of Civil Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
957, 958 (2006). 
 143. See Calabresi, supra note 140; Priest, supra note 142. 
 144. See, e.g., Escola, 150 P.2d at 442; William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the 
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1123-24 (1960) [hereinafter 
Prosser, Assault].
 145. See, e.g., Escola, 150 P.2d at 442; Prosser, Assault, supra note 144, at 1124. 
 146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965). 
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(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
147
 The effect of § 402A was to provide warranty protection to users 
and consumers without any of the contractual-based privity 
limitations.
148
 While it imposed strict liability, it did not make the 
seller of the product an insurer of all harm that results from the uses 
of the product. Liability was limited to harm caused by a product 
“defect” that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer.
149
 Comment (g) specified that the rule only applied 
where the product leaves the seller’s hands “in a condition not 
contemplated by the ultimate consumer,” which renders it 
“unreasonably dangerous to him.”
150
 As explained in Comment (i), a 
product was unreasonably dangerous when it was “dangerous to an 
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchase[d] it, with the ordinary knowledge common 
to the community as to its characteristics.”
151
 These comments led to 
the development of what came to be known as the consumer 
expectation test.
152
C.  Consumer Expectations to Reasonableness 
 The criticisms of the consumer expectation test are legion and 
began almost immediately.
153
 The test is largely the result of the 
contract-based implied warranty roots from which strict products 
liability developed.
154
 Contract law is concerned fundamentally with 
protecting the reasonable expectations induced by the bargained-for 
exchange.
155
 The consumer expectation test was simple enough to 
apply to manufacturing defects where the consumer expected the 
product to conform to the intended design of the product.
156
 However, 
 147. Id. § 402A (emphasis added). 
 148. Id. § 402A cmt. m. 
 149. Id. § 402A cmt. g. 
 150. Id.
 151. Id. § 402A cmt. i. 
 152. See, e.g., Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 475 P.2d 964, 966 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); 
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ill. 1969). 
 153. See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From 
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980); 
Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 
WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1235-37 (1993); Reed Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a 
Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); David A. Fischer, Products Liability—The 
Meaning of Defect, 39 MO. L. REV. 339 (1974); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 89. 
 154. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 5.6 (discussing the warranty roots 
of the test). 
 155. See 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (rev. ed. 1993). 
 156. Owen, Foundations, supra note 12, at 467 (“[W]hile consumers may abstractly 
comprehend the practical necessity of allowing imperfect production, their actual 
expectation when purchasing a new product is that its important attributes will match 
those of other similar units.”).  
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when the product was in the precise condition the manufacturer 
intended, it was far from clear how the consumer expectation test 
should apply. Indeed, as numerous commentators have recognized, 
the drafters of § 402A did not formulate this test with the intent that 
it would be applied to design defect claims.
157
 The problems of the consumer expectation test were particularly 
acute where the product design feature involved a sophisticated and 
technologically complex product about which the consumer had little 
understanding and only the most general expectations regarding 
performance and safety.
158
 To illustrate this problem, Professor 
Twerski discussed a claim involving an injury caused when the 
driver’s seat of the plaintiff’s Ford Navistar collapsed following a rear 
end collision with a 53,000 pound dump truck traveling at thirty 
miles per hour.
159
 Ford maintained that the seat was designed with a 
less rigid structure intended to yield and thereby reduce injuries to 
occupants in more common, lower impact collisions.
160
 This design 
choice involved a compromise between risks that was almost 
certainly unknown to the consumer. How should the consumer 
expectation test be applied to such a design compromise between 
risks? Do consumers expect that seats are designed to provide the 
greatest protection in the most severe collisions or the most probable 
collisions? Do consumers have any expectations regarding the seat 
design? Whatever design is implemented, those whose injuries could 
have been reduced by the selection of the alternative design could 
claim their expectations were not met.
161
 In either case, can one say 
the actual risks associated with the product were greater than those 
that the consumer expected? The standard leaves tremendous 
 157. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerksi, A Proposed Revision of Section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1526 (1992) (“No one, 
for example, could have foreseen that language written primarily to govern manufacturing 
defect cases might be used by courts in design and warning defect cases.”); Kysar, supra 
note 24, at 1712-14 (discussing the limited authority for consumer expectations analysis in 
design defect claims at the time of the drafting of § 402A and the lack of guidance the 
Second Restatement comments provide for formulating a workable standard for 
determining consumer expectation or justifying the standard and citing other authority for 
the same); Priest, Strict, supra note 140, at 2303 (stating that the founders of § 402A 
thought it would apply only to manufacturing defects and assumed that design defect cases 
would be controlled by negligence law). 
 158. See Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 447, 454-55 (Cal. 1978) (adopting a 
consumer expectation test for simple design issues and a risk utility test for complex 
designs but shifting the burden to the defendant to prove that the design was not 
defective); see also Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994). 
 159. Aaron D. Twerski, In Defense of the Products Liability Restatement: Part I, 8 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 31 (1998). The hypothetical is based upon the facts of an unpublished 
case before the Missouri Supreme Court. See id. 
 160. Id.
 161. Id.
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discretion to the jury and provides little guidance to aid them in their 
design defect determination.
162
 In other cases, the consumer expectation test seemed to work 
against the goals of strict liability. For example, if a product contains 
a dangerous design feature readily apparent to the consumer, is the 
consumer denied recovery even where the hazard could have been 
cheaply and simply reduced or eliminated by a change in design? On 
one hand, it is hard to see how the consumer did not expect the 
dangers of an open and obvious hazard.
163
 Indeed, some courts held 
that the test precludes recovery where the dangerousness of the 
product did not exceed the risk contemplated by the consumer 
despite the availability of a reasonable alternative design.
164
 On the 
other hand, such a literal interpretation of the test frustrates the 
goal of encouraging manufacturers to improve product safety by 
reducing risk when it is feasible to do so.
165
 In order to allow recovery 
for the open and obvious hazards of a product design, other courts 
have held that the obvious nature of the hazard is just one factor to 
be considered in determining if the product is unreasonably 
dangerous.
166
 It could be argued that consumers expect 
manufacturers will incorporate safer alternative designs despite the 
consumer’s awareness of the hazard presented by the actual design.
167
 Prompted by the difficulty of applying the consumer expectation 
test to design defect claims, Professors James Henderson and Aaron 
Twerski urged the adoption of an alternative test for liability.
168
 The 
American Law Institute agreed that revisions to § 402A were 
necessary and appointed Professors Henderson and Twerski as 
 162. See id. (“To use the consumer expectations test as a standard of liability in a 
design defect case is just plain silly.”). 
 163. Phillips, supra note 24, at 1049-52 (arguing that barring claims based upon 
obvious product hazards results from an unnecessarily narrow conception of expectations). 
 164. See, e.g., Chaney v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 677, 681 (E.D. La. 1999) 
(stating that the hazards of a meat grinder without a feed pan guard are open and obvious 
to the consumer); Irion v. Sun Lighting, Inc., No. M2002-00766-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 
746823, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2004) (holding that the dangers of a torchiere style 
halogen light was obvious to the ordinary consumer despite evidence of a reasonable 
alternative design consisting of a wire guard placed over the bulb); Vincer v. Esther 
Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Wis. 1975) (stating that 
the hazard of a swimming pool to a two-year-old child is obvious to the consumer so no 
liability exists for failure to include a self-latching gate).  
 165. See, e.g., Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 476 P.2d 713, 719 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1970) (“The manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to escape because 
the product was obviously a bad one.”); Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: 
Rebuilding Barriers to Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1043, 1088 (1994) (noting that the consumer expectation test 
has been applied by courts as a tool to apply the open and obvious danger rule in 
contravention of the goals of strict liability). 
 166. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F. Supp. 206, 210-12 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
 167. See Phillips, supra note 24, at 1049-1051 (suggesting that consumers expect that 
manufacturers will make their products safe despite patent dangers). 
 168. Henderson & Twerksi, supra note 157, at 1514-26. 
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reporters for the products liability provisions of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, the final draft of which was approved in May 1997.  
V.  FAIRNESS AND UTILITY IN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability recognizes 
three broad categories of product defects: manufacturing defects, 
warning defects, and design defects.
169
 The standard for imposing 
liability is distinct for each of these three categories. While strict 
liability is retained for manufacturing defects, strict liability has 
been rejected in favor of a risk-utility balancing test for warning and 
design defect claims. This dramatic departure from strict liability has 
resulted in substantial criticism that the Third Restatement is 
industry friendly and has abandoned the fairness concerns that gave 
birth to strict products liability.
170
 The next section examines the three categories of product defect 
as stated in the Third Restatement from the perspective of both the 
autonomy paradigm and the paradigm of reasonableness. Despite the 
abandonment of strict liability for warnings and design defect claims, 
this analysis reveals that the Third Restatement seeks to balance 
fairness and utility, and generally succeeds. The one glaring 
exception is when bystanders are injured by the inherent risks of 
certain socially useful products. As discussed in Part VI, further 
reform to the Third Restatement is necessary to provide for a fair and 
balanced treatment of bystanders injured by these products.  
A.  Manufacturing Defects 
 Under the Third Restatement, a product “contains a 
manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended 
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation 
and marketing of the product.”
171
 This category of product defect is 
the only one for which the Third Restatement imposes strict 
liability.
172
 Common examples of manufacturing defects include 
products that are contaminated, physically flawed, damaged, or 
incorrectly assembled.
173
 A manufacturer is liable for injuries caused 
 169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). The Third 
Restatement also recognizes distinct product categories and standards of liability for 
prescription drugs, medical devices, and used products. Id. §§ 6, 8. These categories may 
raise additional fairness concerns that are not specifically addressed by this Article. 
However, the same analysis could be applied.  
 170. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24.
 171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (1998). 
 172. Id. § 2 cmt. a. 
 173. Id. § 2 cmt. c. 
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by a manufacturing defect even when reasonable care is exercised in 
manufacturing, testing, and inspecting the product. 
 Just as the reasonableness paradigm cannot account for strict 
liability for ultrahazardous activities, it also cannot account for the 
persistence of strict liability in manufacturing defect cases. The 
selection of raw materials, the manufacturing process, testing, 
assembly, and quality control all involve considerable risk-utility 
considerations on the part of the manufacturer. For example, failure 
to implement reasonable but costly inspection procedures could 
result in a manufacturing defect going undetected and injuring the 
consumer.
174
 But even if the manufacturer could have prevented the 
manufacturing defect from reaching the consumer only through 
extraordinary precautions that would be cost prohibitive under a 
reasonableness analysis, the manufacturer is still liable for harms 
caused by the defect.
175
 Consider, for example, the case in which the wire strands 
designed to hold an automobile tire securely to the wheel’s flange 
contained a manufacturing defect that caused the pressurized tire to 
blow over the tire flange and injure the plaintiff.
176
 If the defect could 
be detected by a visual or tactile inspection of the product, a 
reasonable manufacturer might inspect for such a defect, given the 
probability of harm in the event of the defect. If the defect were 
exceedingly rare, however, and could be detected only by a 
prohibitively costly x-ray inspection of the wire strands, the 
reasonableness paradigm would not impose liability for harm caused 
by the failure to implement such inspections. To impose liability 
under such circumstances would be an inefficient use of resources. 
The consumer would have to pay more for the tires (as the inspection 
costs are passed through) without receiving a commensurate increase 
in security. 
 In contrast, the autonomy model is descriptively simple and nicely 
explains the imposition of liability under both scenarios regardless of 
the efficiency concerns. Returning to the tire explosion scenario, the 
consumer is aware of certain risks associated with the use of an 
automobile and its tire components. He is aware that the tire will 
lose tread and traction over time. If he drives over curbs or nails, the 
tire may become damaged or deflated and cause him to lose control of 
his vehicle and possibly cause him injury. He may even be aware that 
 174. Id. § 2 cmt. a. Utilitarian concerns may also be furthered to the extent that strict 
liability encourages manufacturers to implement reasonable manufacturing and inspecting 
procedures knowing that they may be held liable for all injuries resulting from design 
defects even if it would be impossible for the plaintiff to identify the faulty procedure that 
allowed the defect to reach the consumer. Id.
 175. Id.
 176. See Dico Tire, Inc., v. Cisneros, 953 S.W.2d. 776, 784 (Tex. App. 1997).  
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if he grossly overinflates the tire, it could explode and cause him 
injury.
177
 All of these risks are nonreciprocal in that the plaintiff does 
not impose commensurate risks on the tire manufacturer. But 
liability is not imposed for these expected risks. Yet the autonomy of 
the individual is preserved because he has waived a degree of 
security in exchange for the benefits of the tire. He has implicitly 
consented to these expected risks and presumably has determined 
that the exchange is fair.  
 However, if the manufacturer produces a tire that is defective 
because it does not conform to the intended design, the consumer’s 
expectations are disappointed and his security has been compromised 
to a greater degree than that to which he consented. Indeed, 
consumers expect certain risks associated with the use of all 
products. When using a carving knife to carve the Thanksgiving 
turkey, for example, the consumer has accepted certain risks, 
including the possibility that he might be cut by the sharp knife.
178
These risks are accepted in exchange for the benefits of having a 
sharp knife. However, if the consumer is cut when the knife’s handle 
snaps due to a manufacturing defect, he has been exposed to a risk 
beyond that to which he consented when he purchased and used the 
product.
179
 Accordingly, the consumer did not receive a fair exchange 
of risks and benefits, and liability is imposed regardless of fault. 
 Yet the failure of the reasonableness paradigm to justify the 
imposition of strict liability for manufacturing defects does not mean 
that the Third Restatement fails to account for the demands of social 
utility. The imposition of liability does not force the manufacturer to 
implement inefficient manufacturing and inspection practices; 
instead, the manufacturer must pay for the harms that result from 
the processes selected. The manufacturer can pass these costs on to 
consumers of the nondefective products who have determined that 
the benefits of the product justify its higher price as well as the risks 
associated with the use of the product in its intended design.
180
B.  Warning Defects 
 While strict liability is imposed for manufacturing defects, 
liability for warning or informational defects claims are imposed only 
 177. Such knowledge could result from common experience as evidenced by consumer 
expectations or warnings supplied by the manufacturer.  
 178. Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern 
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 630 (1992) (noting that although the Consumer 
Products Safety Commission reports over 417,000 knife injuries a year, almost no product 
liability claims are brought because consumers appreciate the risks). 
 179. See Nugent v. Utica Cutlery Co., 636 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App. 1982). In Nugent, a 
knife blade broke and flew into plaintiff’s eye while stripping heavy gauge wire. Id. The 
jury refused to find a manufacturing defect, presumably because the knife was misused. Id.
 180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998). 
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after a finding of fault under the Third Restatement.
181
 The 
Restatement provides that a product “is defective because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings . . . and the omission 
of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably 
safe.”
182
 Although a single definition of warning defect is defined in  
§ 2(c), it is clear from Comment (i) that the Third Restatement
recognizes two distinct warning requirements: risk-reduction 
warnings and informed-choice warnings.
183
1.  Risk-reduction Warnings 
 Risk-reduction warnings inform the user how to avoid or reduce 
the risk of product hazards. For example, informing the user that eye 
protection should always be worn when using the product is a typical 
risk-reduction warning. With regard to risk-reduction warnings, the 
Third Restatement adopts a risk-utility test virtually indistinguishable 
from negligence.
184
 Nevertheless, both the paradigm of 
reasonableness and the autonomy paradigm account for these risk-
reduction warnings in product liability cases. Even where the utility 
of the product justifies the risk from a social welfare perspective, the 
product must have adequate warnings or instructions for use that 
will allow the user to avoid or reduce the dangers.
185
 This 
requirement is consistent with the reasonableness paradigm because 
making the use of the product safer enhances social welfare by 
decreasing the costs of the product’s use, while still retaining the 
product’s utility.
186
 However, autonomy is also protected by providing information to 
the user of the product that will allow the user to make informed 
decisions about waiving a certain degree of security in exchange for 
the benefit of using the product.
187
 Similarly, if the product does not 
contain adequate warnings or instruction, the autonomy paradigm 
imposes liability because the user of the product was exposed to a 
 181. Id.
 182. Id. § 2(c). 
 183. See id. § 2 cmt. i.  
 184. Id. § 2 cmt. d. 
 185. Id.
 186. See id.; see, e.g., Hollister v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 201 F.3d 731, 741 (6th Cir. 
2000) (applying Michigan law to a suit alleging that a shirt was defective because the 
manufacturer failed to warn of the shirt’s dangerous flammability).  
 187. See Madden, supra note 12, at 1059-67 (discussing how the Third Restatement
section on warning defects balances both corrective justice and economic efficiency concerns). 
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risk that was not consented to in exchange for the benefits sought 
from the product.
188
2.  Informed-choice Warnings 
 The Third Restatement also imposes liability where the product 
contains risks of use that are inherent in the product and might not 
be avoidable or reduced as a result of the warning provided.
189
 These 
types of warnings are known as informed-choice warnings because 
they allow the user to make an autonomous choice whether to 
confront the danger or avoid it by choosing not to use the product.
190
This rationale is expressly discussed in Comment (i) to § 2 of the 
Third Restatement:
In addition to alerting users and consumers to the existence 
and nature of product risks so that they can, by appropriate 
conduct during use or consumption, reduce the risk of harm, 
warnings also may be needed to inform users and consumers of 
nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoidably inhere 
in using or consuming the product. Such warnings allow the user 
or consumer to avoid the risk warned against by making an 
informed decision not to purchase or use the product at all and 
hence not to encounter the risk. In this context, warnings must be 
provided for inherent risks that reasonably foreseeable product 
users and consumers would reasonably deem material or 
significant in deciding whether to use or consume the product. 
Whether or not many persons would, when warned, nonetheless 
decide to use or consume the product, warnings are required to 
protect the interests of those reasonably foreseeable users or 
consumers who would, based on their own reasonable assessments 
of the risks and benefits, decline product use or consumption.
191
These warnings are distinct from risk-reduction warnings that 
inform the user how to avoid or reduce the risk of hazard while using 
the product.  
 The autonomy paradigm clearly accounts for the requirement of 
additional, nonutilitarian warnings. These warnings provide users of 
 188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1998). The 
Third Restatement also provides that a product seller is not subject to liability for failing to 
warn or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or 
generally known by, foreseeable product users. Id. cmt. j. See Madden, supra note 12, at 
1037, for a detailed analysis of the balancing of autonomy and utility in this provision, with 
which I concur. 
 189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1998). 
 190. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
PROBLEMS & PROCESS 352 (6th ed. 2008) (providing a detailed discussion of the distinction 
between risk-reduction warnings and informed-choice warnings as well as the distinct 
rationales, utilitarian for the former and individual rights for the latter, justifying the two 
types of warning).  
 191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1998). 
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the product with knowledge of the product’s dangers that allow them 
to make informed individual decisions regarding the degree of risk 
they are willing to encounter regardless of the utility of the 
product.
192
 The only purpose for the warning is to allow users to make a 
subjective determination as to whether the risks are worth the 
benefits, regardless of the objective risk-utility calculation that might 
be made from the social welfare reasonableness paradigm.
193
 It allows 
users to decline to use even efficient products because they are 
unwilling to waive their right to be free from the additional risks.
194
Accordingly, the autonomy paradigm provides a clear rationale for these 
informed-choice warnings while the reasonableness paradigm cannot.  
 These informed-choice warnings are widely recognized in products 
liability cases and have been particularly prevalent in claims 
involving prescription drugs and toxic materials.
195
 For example, in 
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., the plaintiff contracted 
asbestosis as a result of working with asbestos insulation.
196
 In this 
early asbestos case, the court acknowledged that “[t]he utility of an 
insulation product containing asbestos may outweigh the known or 
foreseeable risk.”
197
 Nevertheless, the court held that the 
manufacturer had a duty to warn of the hazard because the worker 
had a right to decide whether to be exposed to the risk even if the 
manufacturer could not otherwise reduce the hazard.
198
 Pharmaceutical cases based upon failure to provide informed-
choice warnings often have presented insurmountable evidentiary 
 192. Id.
 193. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(“The rationale for this rule is that the user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice 
as to whether the product’s utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of harm. 
Thus, a true choice situation arises, and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a reasonable man 
would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it.”). 
 194. See David E. Bernstein, Learning the Wrong Lessons From “An American 
Tragedy”: A Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1961 (2006). Professor Bernstein has argued informed choice warnings impose serious costs 
on society by causing consumers to avoid useful products because of unrealistic or 
disproportionate fears. For example, some parents refuse to vaccinate their children 
because of unsubstantiated claims that a preservative in the vaccines causes autism. Id.
at 1977. 
 195. See generally Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed 
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257 (2005) (discussing the application of 
informed-choice warnings to pharmaceutical and toxic tort claims).  
 196. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1081. 
 197. Id. at 1105. 
 198. Id. at 1105-06. While the reader, armed with today’s knowledge of the incredible 
harm caused by asbestos, may dispute that a risk-utility analysis could weigh in favor of 
the use of asbestos-containing products, the general problem of hidden dangers within 
socially useful products is not readily disputable. In fact, an EPA ban on asbestos-
containing products was struck down because of the failure to properly consider the risk 
and benefits of asbestos compared to alternative products. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking down the EPA’s 
asbestos ban). 
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hurdles for plaintiffs in terms of establishing scientific proof of 
causation.
199
 While the Third Restatement does not provide an 
independent cause of action that allows plaintiffs to recover for the 
failure to provide informed-choice warnings where proof of causation 
is lacking, such an independent cause of action has been suggested.
200
Professors Berger and Twerski conclude that the tremendous hurdles 
presented by Daubert’s reliability requirements,
201
 and the associated 
costs of litigation, render it impossible to prove causation in many 
pharmaceutical cases.
202
 The solution they propose is a cause of 
action that would compensate the plaintiff, not for the unproven 
drug-related injury, but for the depravation of the right to make an 
autonomous decision regarding the use of the product caused by the 
failure to warn of scientifically uncertain but material risks.
203
 The 
cause of action would be similar to negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, and the plaintiff would be permitted to recover dignitary 
tort damages for the loss of the right to autonomous 
decisionmaking.
204
 Such a cause of action cannot be justified by the 
reasonableness paradigm because, from an objective risk-benefit 
analysis, the product’s known risks are outweighed by its perceived 
benefits. However, the autonomy paradigm supports such a cause of 
action because individual consumers should have the right to make 
subjective determinations about whether they are willing to consent 
to the risks in exchange for the benefits of the drug. 
 While most informed-choice warning claims have involved toxic 
torts and pharmaceutical products, the theory has been extended to 
other products liability cases where these evidentiary issues are less 
burdensome. In Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., for example, the plaintiffs 
were injured following the rollover of a 1986 Ford Bronco II.
205
Plaintiffs claimed that Ford failed to warn of the substantial stability 
problems associated with the Bronco II, despite knowledge of the 
vehicle’s propensity to roll over even at low speeds.
206
 Ford’s expert 
maintained that no warning could have prevented the rollover that 
occurred because the plaintiff was confronted with the need for an 
emergency maneuver that was necessary regardless of the operator’s 
knowledge of the potential for a rollover.
207
 The court rejected this 
 199. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 195, at 258. See Bernstein, supra note 194, for a 
critical response to this article. 
 200. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 195, at 259.  
 201. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 202. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 195, at 264-67 (discussing the paucity of pre-
approval studies, the rejection of animal studies, and the numerous reasons courts find to 
reject expert opinions based upon epidemiological studies). 
 203. Id. at 282-87. 
 204. See id.
 205. Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 206. Id. at 1219. 
 207. Id.
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argument, noting risk reduction was only one purpose of product 
warnings.
208
 The court recognized that a more fundamental purpose 
of such a warning is to allow consumers to make informed decisions 
whether to use the product in the first instance.
209
 Such warnings 
allow users to decline to use even the most efficient products where 
they are unwilling to waive their right to be free from the additional 
risks.
210
 Under the facts of the case, Watkins is an example of an 
informed-choice warning; because the emergency maneuver was 
unavoidable, the warning could not have prevented the accident 
through safer use. The warning could have prevented the accident 
only if the plaintiff, so warned, chose not to purchase the product.  
 Many other cases involve warnings that serve both to reduce risk 
as well as to protect autonomous decisionmaking. For example, 
manufacturers of three-wheeled all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) incurred 
tremendous liability as a result of the propensity of ATVs to flip over 
causing serious injuries to the riders.
211
 While the ATVs probably 
were defectively designed under a risk-utility analysis,
212
 the 
manufacturers also failed to properly warn consumers of the inherent 
danger of rollovers.
213
 Such warnings would not only help users to 
avoid injury by exercising extreme care but would also enable them 
to make an informed choice about whether they wished to confront 
the risk in the first instance.
214
 The debate continues as to whether manufacturers should be 
strictly liable for failure to warn of dangers that they reasonably 
could not have foreseen.
215
 The trend in most jurisdictions, and the 
position taken by the Third Restatement, is that the duty to warn is 
limited to those risks of which the manufacturer had knowledge or 
 208. Id.
 209. Id.
 210. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 211. Sidney Shapiro, Ruth Ruttenberg & Paul Leigh, The Social Costs of Dangerous 
Products: An Empirical Investigation, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 775, 816 (2009) 
(reporting that the average value of claims settled by Honda, the largest manufacturer of 
three-wheel ATVs, for accidents between 1978 and 1988 was $859,003 and that Honda had 
paid $84 million in settlements through 1990).  
 212. Id. at 815 (discussing the dangerous design aspects of three-wheel ATVs). 
 213. See Consumer Products Safety Comm’n, ATV Action Plans (2008), 
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/cpsia/atvactionplan.pdf (providing links to the consent decrees); 
Gary T. Ford & Michael B. Mazis, Informing Buyers of Risks: Analysis of the Marketing 
and Regulation of All Terrain Vehicles, 30 J. CONSUMER AFF. 90 (1996) (discussing 
the manufacturer’s failure to warn consumers of the inherent dangers of three-wheel ATVs 
and analyzing the effectiveness of the 1988 consent decree between the Department of 
Justice and the ATV manufacturers which required numerous advertising, warning, and 
training measures).  
 214. See Ogozaly v. Am. Honda Motor Co. Inc., 67 Pa. D. & C.4th 314, 319-20 (Pa. C.P. 
Lackawanna Cnty. 2004) (discussing a dispute between Honda and U-Haul over informed 
choice warnings U-Haul added to Honda ATVs it leased to consumers). 
 215. See Wertheimer, supra note 24. 
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reasonably should have had knowledge.
216
 This approach, despite the 
strict liability misnomer used by some courts, is identical to a 
negligence approach and fits well within the reasonableness paradigm.  
 But the imposition of strict liability for failure to warn even of 
unknowable risks remains the law in some jurisdictions.
217
 This 
approach cannot be justified by the reasonableness paradigm because 
it imposes liability even when the reasonable defendant could not 
take the unknown risk into account when preparing product 
warnings. The autonomy paradigm, however, does account for the 
imposition of liability for unknowable risks because the consumer 
does not consent to these risks. As between the manufacturer and the 
consumer, the manufacturer, as the expert, is in the best position to 
discover these dangers and should compensate the consumer for the 
loss that its product causes.
218
 Manufacturers can test the product 
and have profited from the sale of the product.
219
 They can also 
spread the cost of the harm to all of those that continue to find utility 
in the product despite its newly discovered dangers.    
C.  Design Defects 
Certainly, no area of products liability law has been the subject of 
more controversy or confusion than the proper standard for liability 
in claims involving design defects. Faced with the difficulty of 
applying the amorphous consumer expectation test of § 402A, 
commentators and the courts quickly turned to the more familiar, 
and seemingly more precise,
220
 risk-utility test common to 
 216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m (1998) 
(“Unforeseeable risks arising from foreseeable product use or consumption by definition 
cannot specifically be warned against. Thus, in connection with a claim of inadequate 
design, instruction, or warning, plaintiff should bear the burden of establishing that the 
risk in question was known or should have been known to the relevant manufacturing 
community. The harms that result from unforeseeable risks—for example, in the human 
body’s reaction to a new drug, medical device, or chemical—are not a basis of liability.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987); 
Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Mont. 1997); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, 
Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Wis. 2001); see also Wertheimer, supra note 24, at 900-06.  
 218. Wertheimer, supra note 24, at 902 (citing Green, 629 N.W.2d at 754-55). 
 219. See Green, 629 N.W.2d at 750 (“[T]he primary ‘rationale underlying the imposition 
of strict liability on manufacturers and sellers is that the risk of the loss associated with 
the use of defective products should be borne by those who have created the risk and who 
have reaped the profit by placing a defective product in the stream of commerce.’ ” (quoting 
Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1990)); Korzec, supra note 24, at 242 (noting that 
“the manufacturer still profits at the expense of the injured consumer from a product 
containing unknowable or undiscoverable product defects”). 
 220. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 571 (“In assessing the 
reasonableness of risks, lawyers ask many seemingly precise questions . . . . One can speak of 
formulae, like the Learned Hand formula, and argue in detail about questions of costs, benefits 
and trade-offs. This style of thinking is attractive to the legal mind.” (footnote omitted)). 
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negligence.
221
 While these tests vary in their formulation, they 
invariably resemble some form of cost-benefit calculus. This 
utilitarian test for design defects has been embraced as the sole test 
by the Third Restatement.
222
 Specifically, the Third Restatement
provides that a product “is defective in design when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and 
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not 
reasonably safe.”
223
 The requirement of a reasonable alternative 
design (RAD) involves establishing that the proposed alternative 
design reduces or eliminates the hazard while not creating other 
hazards, at a reasonable cost both in terms of product price and 
utility.
224
 Consumer expectations may be considered in the risk-
utility calculus (particularly where consumer expectations are 
influenced by product marketing), but they cannot prevail where the 
utilitarian balance weighs in favor of the product design feature that 
injured the plaintiff or where the plaintiff fails to produce evidence of 
a RAD.
225
 In short, the plaintiff must build a better mousetrap, 
automobile, or drill press as the case may be.  
 The Third Restatement’s RAD test mirrors the reasonableness 
paradigm even more clearly than does the typical negligence claim. 
In most jurisdictions, jurors are instructed that negligence is the 
failure to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others under the 
circumstances of the case.
226
 This leaves tremendous latitude for the 
jury to determine what factors to consider and how to weigh these 
factors in determining if the conduct created an unreasonable risk of 
harm.
227
 The Third Restatement’s test expressly incorporates the 
 221. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d reporters’ 
note II.A. (1998) (citing Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372, 378-79 (Mich. 
1982); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983); Turner v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979)); id. at II.B. (citing Radiation Tech., Inc. v. 
Ware Constr. Co., 445 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983); St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 
A.2d 1283, 1286 (Me. 1988); Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1982)).  
 222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998). 
 223. Id.
 224. Id. § 2 cmt. f. 
 225. Id. § 2 cmt. g. 
 226. See, e.g., Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P.2d 657, 658 n.1 (Alaska 1964) (approving 
jury instructions that defined negligence as “the want of ordinary care; that is, the want of 
such care as an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person would exercise under like 
circumstances”); MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE, VIRGINIA MODEL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS—Civil 4.000 (2009) (“Negligence is the failure to use ordinary care. 
Ordinary care is the care a reasonable person would have used under the circumstances of 
this case.”).
 227. See generally Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue 
Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000) (arguing that negligence law’s 
reasonable person standard does not require and should not be understood as compelling a 
neoclassical economics’ efficiency maximizing actor but includes consideration of broad 
virtues including prudence and concern for the safety of others); Lyons, supra note 12 
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Learned Hand calculation
228
 and instructs the jury on the RAD 
requirement.
229
 The test’s exclusive focus on utilitarian concerns 
subjects it to the same fundamental criticism Fletcher found 
repugnant with the application of the reasonableness paradigm to 
negligence-based claims. The RAD test for design defects seeks to 
resolve a private dispute between a product manufacturer and an 
injured consumer by considering what is most efficient for society 
rather than what is just between the parties.
230
 Where a plaintiff 
is injured as the result of a dangerous but socially beneficial 
product design, the plaintiff must bear his or her injuries 
without compensation.
231
 Nevertheless, both the autonomy paradigm and the RAD test of 
the Third Restatement result in similar outcomes in many design 
defect cases involving injury to users and purchasers of products. 
Assume, for example, that the plaintiff purchases a compact car and 
is injured in a collision when he loses control and strikes a tree.
232
Additional safety features would significantly increase the car’s 
weight, reduce fuel economy, and increase production costs and the 
purchase price.
233
 Accordingly, although the alternative design is 
safer for the driver, the increase in cost and loss in fuel efficiency 
could outweigh the improvement in safety under the RAD test.
234
 Similarly, as long as the risks and benefits of compact cars are 
known to consumers, the autonomy paradigm would also deny 
compensation under these circumstances. The consumer consents to 
the greater risk of the compact car in exchange for the benefits of less 
expensive transportation. He may also seek other benefits such as 
using fewer scarce resources, producing less pollution, and having 
the convenience of a vehicle that is easy to park. Whatever the 
perceived benefits, the consumer has received what he considers a 
fair exchange of risks for benefits. The risk-benefit exchange was 
consented to by the consumer, and liability is not imposed.  
 Consider another example where both the RAD test and the 
autonomy paradigm would impose liability. At night, a young child 
(discussing various noneconomic factors the finder of fact should consider in determining 
whether a defendant’s conduct was reasonable). 
 228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a reporters’ note 
(1998) (citing David Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability 
Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 754-55 (1996)); see also Twerski, supra note 159, at 31 
(“The risk utility test has its origin in the Learned Hand test for negligence.”).  
 229. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998) (“[P]laintiff 
must prove that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced the foreseeable risks 
of harm . . . .”). 
 230. See id.
 231. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 542. 
 232. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f, illus. 9 (1998). 
 233. See id.
 234. See id.
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trips over the electrical cord of a hot-water vaporizer on her way to 
the bathroom.
235
 As a result, the vaporizer tips over, spilling the hot 
water on her and causing serious burns.
236
 The plaintiff produces 
evidence of an alternative vaporizer design in which the water 
container is firmly secured to the rest of the unit.
237
 As long as the 
alternative design does not unreasonably increase the cost of the 
vaporizer or significantly decrease its utility, the Third Restatement’s 
RAD test would impose liability on the manufacturer of the product.
238
  The autonomy paradigm would also impose liability in the 
vaporizer scenario. It does so because of the realities of the consumer 
marketplace in which consumers cannot and do not possess the 
design expertise of the manufacturer. The same rationales that lead 
to the creation of implied warranties of merchantability support 
liability under the autonomy paradigm. While the consumer expects 
certain risks associated with the use of any product, she also expects 
that the manufacturer of the product has employed its superior 
expertise and knowledge to create a design that reduces the risk of 
the product without impairing its utility or increasing its cost.
239
 If 
the manufacturer fails to do so, the consumer does not receive a fair 
exchange of risks for benefits, and liability should be imposed on the 
defendant.
240
 As applied to users and consumers, the RAD test can be 
justified by both the reasonableness model and the autonomy model.  
 Yet something important may have been lost in the change from 
the consumer expectation test to the RAD requirement. However 
valid the theory behind the RAD test, ultimately the courts and 
juries must apply the test to the often complex facts of the case. 
Undoubtedly, the algebraic Learned Hand formula appeals to those 
who seek to infuse the law with objective scientific principles.
241
Imposing liability based upon evidence of a RAD seems to place the law 
on a more solid footing than establishing mere consumer expectation.
242
 However, the factors weighed in the Learned Hand formula are, if 
anything, more ethereal and incapable of precise quantification than 
 235. Id. illus. 6. This illustration is apparently based upon the facts in McCormack v. 
Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967). 
 236. Id.
 237. See id. illus. 7. 
 238. See id.
 239. See, e.g., Korzec, supra note 24, at 236 (discussing consumer expectations in terms 
of consumer entitlement to safety rather than actual knowledge of the product risks). 
 240. See id. at 240 (Consumers pay for safety assurance in the product price and are 
entitled to receive the benefit of the bargain.).  
 241. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 571 (discussing the appeal of the 
“seemingly precise questions” posed by the Learned Hand formula but suggesting that the 
precision is illusionary).  
 242. Id.
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consumer expectations.
243
 Judges and jurors typically have no 
training in the complex sciences and engineering principles employed 
in product designs. As a result, they are largely dependent upon the 
testimony of experts retained by the parties to explain the relative 
advantages and risks of the existing design and the RAD.
244
 The 
finder of fact is often charged with resolving conflicting expert 
testimony but is clearly ill-equipped to do so.
245
 The degree of utility 
provided by both the existing design and the proposed alternative 
design is impossible to place into precise values.
246
 Such analysis 
raises polycentric problems because a proposed RAD that reduces the 
risk of one hazard may enhance the risk of another hazard.
247
 The problem is further compounded where the existing product 
design creates risks of harm unrelated to the harm that injured the 
plaintiff. Evidence of design dangers unrelated to the harm that 
caused the plaintiff’s injury are often excluded as not being substantially 
 243. See Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict 
Liability Actions For Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189, 1192 n.24 
(1994) (“Though valuable in analysis involving quantifiable economic costs, it is quickly 
rendered into inescapable quagmires of conflicting values when applied in settings 
involving non-monetary consequences, such as environmental disputes and disputes over 
loss of life and personal injury. Even the most expensive analysis done by experts for 
legislative and administrative bodies is highly contentious and difficult. Needless to say, 
attempting to perform this analysis in personal injury litigation is neither a productive nor 
a useful exercise.”).  
 244. See John L. Watts, To Tell the Truth: A Qui Tam Action for Perjury in a Civil 
Proceeding is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil Judicial System, 79 TEMP. L.
REV. 773 (2006) (discussing the market incentives for expert witnesses to color their 
testimony in favor of the party that retains them and the difficulty of effectively cross-
examining expert witnesses). 
 245. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (The 
Ninth Circuit openly discussed these difficulties while considering Daubert on remand from 
the Supreme Court: “[T]herefore, though we are largely untrained in science and certainly 
no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our 
responsibility to determine whether those experts’ proposed testimony amounts to 
‘scientific knowledge,’ constitutes ‘good science,’ and was ‘derived by the scientific 
method.’ ”); see also Justin P. Murphy, Note, Expert Witnesses at Trial: Where Are the 
Ethics?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 226, 236, 239 (2000) (discussing difficulties 
confronting courts and lawyers in evaluating expert testimony and proposing creation of 
permanent organization to provide courts with experts to assist them in their gatekeeping 
function); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE L. J. 353, 388 (1988) (questioning the ability of juries to evaluate the utility of 
product designs).  
 246. See Murphy, supra note 245; Schwartz, supra note 245 (questioning the ability of 
juries to evaluate the utility of product designs). 
 247. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design 
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1550-52 (1973) (noting that 
design choices involve polycentric problems which courts are institutionally ill-equipped to 
evaluate); Kysar, supra note 24, at 1740 (discussing research that suggests that the risk-
utility calculus implemented by the RAD test of the Third Restatement is misconceived); 
see also Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391, 397 (Mass. 1980) (providing an 
example of a polycentric design issue). 
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similar to the case under consideration.
248
 Even if the trier of fact can 
determine the relative safety and utility of the challenged design as 
compared to the RAD, how is this balanced against the harm? As the 
courts have recognized, the value of compensation for harm is left to 
the discretion and wisdom of jurors and can vary widely from case to 
case.
249
 There simply are no tools to measure a pound of pain and no 
market in which to determine its value.
250
 In fact, if the finder of fact could reliably, precisely, and accurately 
evaluate RADs, verdicts in design defect claims would result in 
injunctive relief in addition to compensatory damages. Once it has 
been established, from a utilitarian perspective, that the existing 
product design is inferior to the RAD, what justification is there for 
allowing the defective design to continue to be produced? If the RAD 
test is thought to be reliable, the law should compel product 
modification or enjoin production of the existing design. The failure 
to do so suggests a lack of confidence in the competence of jurors to 
correctly select the design that will best enhance safety while 
retaining the product utility. Jurors are not generally engineers, 
scientists, or economists and cannot be expected to fully understand 
the complex factors they must balance in the risk-utility reasonably 
alternative design analysis. Jurors are, however, ordinary consumers 
that have an innate understanding of what consumers expect in 
terms of a fair exchange.
251
 248. Generally, courts only allow evidence of prior accidents where the facts and 
circumstances of the prior accidents are substantially similar to the plaintiff’s accidents. 
See generally OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 6.4. This substantial similarity 
inquiry is often quite narrow. Id. However, if the reason the prior accident evidence is 
introduced is to establish that the RAD results in a safer product, all prior accidents that 
could have been prevented by the plaintiff’s RAD should be admitted even if not similar in 
other respects to the plaintiff’s accident. 
 249. See, e.g., Richmond Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Garthright, 24 S.E. 267, 269 (Va. 1896) (“No 
method has yet been devised, nor scales adjusted, by which to measure or weigh and value 
in money the degrees of pain and anguish of a suffering human being, nor ever likely to be; 
and we cannot say, upon the evidence in this case, that $1,000 was excessive damages. It 
was not so great, considering the injuries proved to have been sustained by the plaintiff, as 
to furnish ground for believing that the jury were actuated by partiality or prejudice; and, 
unless this is the case, under the well-settled rule in this state, the court should not disturb 
the verdict.”). 
 250. The problem is particularly complex and indefinite in cases where the victim is 
killed. Wrongful death claims do not compensate the decedent for his loss of life. Rather, 
they only permit the decedent’s beneficiaries to recover for the loss of services and certain 
pecuniary losses resulting from the death of the decedent. Some also allow for 
compensation for the grief of the decedent’s beneficiaries. Such monetary compensation, for 
example, damages awarded for the parents grief over the loss of an only child, is hardly 
capable of providing useful numbers for performing the risk-utility analysis contemplated 
by the algebraic formula. Even if monetary compensation for the grief of the parent was 
the equivalent of the value of the child to the parent, the deceased child’s loss of a full life 
and all it encompasses—the struggles, achievements, and innumerable pleasures—is all 
left unaccounted for in the analysis. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 298 
(2000) (discussing the availability of nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death cases). 
 251. Note, supra note 24. 
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VI.  BYSTANDER LIABILITY
 Where the RAD test most clearly conflicts with the autonomy 
paradigm is when the injured party is a bystander rather than a user 
or consumer of the product. Bystanders injured by product designs 
stand in a distinctively different position from consumers.
252
 They 
have no opportunity to evaluate the product, consider the reputation 
of the manufacturer, read the warnings, consider the risks, or enjoy 
the product’s benefits.
253
 When a bystander is harmed by a danger 
inherent in the product design, it cannot be fairly said that he or she 
has consented to the risks an ordinary consumer expects to 
accompany the product.
254
 More importantly, a bystander has not 
received the product’s benefits that the users and consumers receive 
in exchange for the risks they confront in product use.
255
 As a result, 
Fletcher’s nonreciprocal risk test works well with regard to 
bystanders because there is no bargained-for relationship between 
the manufacturer and the bystander injured by an inherent risk of 
the product.
256
 Yet the Third Restatement’s RAD test treats the 
relationship between the product and plaintiff as irrelevant.  
 The tenacity with which courts adhered to the privity 
requirement, even in negligence-based product liability claims, 
resulted in part from a recognition that those involved in the 
selection and purchase of products are different from the rest of the 
world that comes in contact with the product. With the shift from 
contract to tort liability, it would have made more sense to first apply 
tort law to those not in privity, rather than those who purchased the 
product.
257
 Indeed, several cases
258
 and scholarly commentators noted 
 252. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., “Good Whiskey,” Drunk Driving, and Innocent Bystanders: 
The Responsibility of Manufacturers of Alcohol and Other Dangerous Hedonic Products for 
Bystander Injury, 45 S.C. L. REV. 269, 273 (1994) [hereinafter Cochran, Good Whiskey];
Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 
U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 642 (1971); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Dangerous Products and 
Injured Bystanders, 81 KY. L.J. 687, 695 (1993) [hereinafter Cochran, Dangerous Products].
 253. Cochran, Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 688; see also Cochran, Good 
Whiskey, supra note 252, at 273; Note, supra note 252, at 642.  
 254. See Cochran, Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 693; Cochran, Good Whiskey,
supra note 252, at 283.  
 255. Cochran, Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 704-05. 
 256. See id. at 701-02; Cochran, Good Whiskey, supra note 252, at 284-85.  
 257. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 553 (2009) (noting that respect for contract principles does 
not require the application of the economic loss rule bar to third parties not in privity of 
contract and discussing cases so holding). 
 258. See, e.g., Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969). In Elmore, the 
plaintiff was injured when the drive shaft of a 1962 Rambler American station wagon 
dropped to the pavement causing the vehicle to swerve into the oncoming lane of traffic 
and collide with the plaintiff’s vehicle. Id. at 85. The court reversed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s strict liability claim, holding that bystanders may maintain a 
cause of action on the same terms as users and consumers. Id. at 89. The court observed 
that the policy rationale justifying strict liability applies to bystanders as well as users and 
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that bystanders injured by a defective product were, from a fairness 
perspective, more deserving of recovery than were those who 
purchased or used the product and had an opportunity to inspect for 
defects and select a product for its benefits, including a competitive 
price perhaps made possible only because of cost-saving measures 
that increased product risks.
259
 Despite the awareness of the 
important distinction between consumers and bystanders, the fall of 
privity resulted in a complete disregard of the relationship between 
the injured party and the product. This failure to distinguish 
between consumers and bystanders has remained because of the 
exclusive focus on fault rather than fairness in the determination 
of liability.  
 Although the Restatement (Second) of Torts took no position as to 
whether § 402A should apply to claims by persons other than users 
or consumers,
260
 almost all jurisdictions that considered the issue did 
apply it to injured bystanders.
261
 By its own terms, the consumer 
expectation test is ill-suited to bystander claims. After all, what 
expectation does the nonconsumer have regarding the product?
262
Nevertheless, a separate test for liability to bystanders injured by 
defective products is unnecessary in the case of manufacturing 
defects because the consumer never expected that the product would 
deviate from the manufacturer’s design. Whenever a consumer or 
bystander was injured as a result of a manufacturing defect, liability 
was imposed. But when the injury is the result of a design defect, it 
seems ridiculous to analyze the bystander’s claims in terms of 
disappointed consumer expectations.
263
 The purchaser implicitly or 
expressly consents to certain design hazards in exchange for the 
benefits provided by the product’s design in terms of costs or utility. 
On the other hand, the bystander had no expectations regarding the 
product he neither purchased nor used.
264
 Nevertheless, courts 
consumers. Id. It characterized the restrictions on bystander recovery as an unjustified 
vestige of the privity requirement and stated that “bystanders should be entitled to greater 
protection than the consumer or user” who may inspect for defect and purchase selectively. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 259. Note, supra note 252, at 642; see also Bohlen, supra note 120, at 354-55; Cochran, 
Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 693; Cochran, Good Whiskey, supra note 252, at 273.  
 260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Caveat (1) (1966).  
 261. Howard Latin & Bobby Kasolas, Bad Designs, Lethal Profits: The Duty to Protect 
Other Motorists Against SUV Collision Risks, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (2002) (noting the 
uniform application of § 402A to claims against automobile manufacturers brought by 
bystanders including motorists in other vehicles and citing cases). 
 262. See Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 706 P.2d 929, 935 (Or. 1985) (interpreting an 
Oregon statute based upon § 402A’s consumer expectation test and holding that a 
pedestrian struck by a truck was not a consumer whose expectations could be considered in 
determining if the truck was defective). 
 263. Davis, supra note 153, at 1236-37.  
 264. Id. at 1236. 
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applied the same consumer expectation test to bystanders’ claims of 
design defect.
265
 In one respect, the Restatement (Third) on Torts: Products 
Liability improved upon the Second Restatement by broadly covering 
harms to “persons or property”
266
 rather than the more limited 
“user[s and] consumer[s]” of § 402A.
267
 Accordingly, bystanders 
injured by a defective product are expressly covered by the Third 
Restatement.
268
 But the shift from the nebulous consumer expectation 
test to the risk-utility RAD test actually exacerbated the unfairness 
of applying a single test for liability to consumers and bystanders. 
The ill-defined consumer expectation test left room for jurors’ 
intuitive notions of fairness to creep in and influence their verdict 
where the injured party was a stranger to the product. The more 
precisely defined risk-utility RAD test simply leaves no room for 
consideration of the plaintiff’s relationship to the product. The RAD 
test, based upon utilitarian principles, logically applies to both 
consumers and bystanders injured by product designs. The test 
regards the relationship between product and plaintiff as irrelevant 
because its goal is to maximize social welfare.  
 While numerous commentators have noted the unique 
circumstances of bystanders, Professor Robert Cochran, Jr. has been 
the sole voice proposing a products liability rule that provides 
compensation for losses resulting from the nonreciprocal nature of 
the risks certain products impose on those who neither use nor 
purchase them.
269
 He suggests that injured bystanders should not 
have to prove product defect in order to recover when they have 
established the following: “1) the product is dangerous; 2) the product 
is an hedonic product, that is, that it is primarily used for purposes of 
entertainment and enjoyment; and 3) the plaintiff was a bystander, 
i.e., one whom the product did not benefit.”
270
 Professor Cochran 
primarily discusses his novel cause of action as applied to alcohol-
related accidents that injure nondrinkers.
271
 Intoxicated drivers 
impose nonreciprocal risks on other drivers and pedestrians. Cochran 
makes a compelling argument that the costs of these harms should be 
 265. Since the consumer expectation test is an objective test, the same test can be 
applied even if sound reasons justify a more liberal test for liability. See Note, supra note 
252, at 627-35 (discussing early cases applying the consumer expectation test to bystanders 
without considering the implications). 
 266. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998). 
 267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 268. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. d (1998). 
 269. See Cochran, Good Whiskey, supra note 252, at 285.  
 270. Id. at 274.
 271. See id. at 275-86. Cochran also applied his rule to secondhand tobacco smoke and 
firearms and suggested it could apply to other products like pleasure boats. Robert F. 
Cochran, Jr., From Cigarettes to Alcohol: The Next Step in Hedonic Product Liability?, 27 
PEPP. L. REV. 701, 711 (2000).  
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spread among alcohol consumers rather than the injured bystanders. 
Cochran also applies his rule to secondhand smoke and firearms.  
 Although Cochran relies upon Fletcher’s paradigm of reciprocity, 
it is not clear why bystanders injured by hedonistic products are 
more deserving of compensation than bystanders injured by 
dangerous products with more functional utility.
272
 Cochran 
acknowledges that hedonistic products are important but insists they 
are not as important as other, more essential products.
273
Fundamentally, this distinction just favors one form of utility over 
another. The bystander injured by the inherent dangers of forklifts, 
tractor-trailers, or asbestos seems just as deserving of compensation 
as bystanders injured by firearms, alcohol, or secondhand smoke. In 
either case, the bystander is sacrificed as a means to achieve the 
goals of the product’s consumer.  
 In fact, the greater the product’s utility, the greater its capacity to 
absorb the costs of injuries to bystanders. As the price of the product 
increases, products with less utility will price themselves out of the 
market. Wealthy consumers of hedonistic products may continue to 
purchase them while less affluent consumers will have to forgo the 
pleasures of these products. In the case of products with more 
functional utility, they will continue to be consumed to the extent 
that they can pay their own way. Products with the greatest utility, 
particularly commercial products, will certainly continue to be 
consumed because they will enhance the profits of commercial 
enterprises despite their costs.  
 However, most of the injuries to bystanders caused by dangerous 
products like alcohol and firearms are the result of superseding 
intentional acts of consumers.
274
 Traditional proximate cause 
doctrines preclude the imposition of even strict liability for 
intervening intentional criminal acts. Drunk driving and firearm 
violence are already prohibited by criminal laws. To impose liability 
on the manufacturers of these products, in the absence of 
contributing fault on their part, would require a dramatic shift in 
proximate cause analysis.
275
 272. It is not clear how to distinguish hedonistic products from nonhedonistic products. 
Many products are utilized for both entertainment and enjoyment as well as for less 
pleasurable purposes. Firearms have tremendous utility for self-defense, but they are also 
used for pleasure. Many, if not most, consumers utilize their automobiles for both 
pleasurable and purely functional purposes. Should liability be imposed when a bystander 
is injured while on a Sunday drive but not when on the way to an early shift at the factory?  
 273. Cochran, Good Whiskey, supra note 252, at 279-80. 
 274. See DOBBS, supra note 250, §§ 190, 195. 
 275. Conversely, many commercial products cause injuries to bystanders even when 
the consumer is not acting as a superseding intentional tortfeasor. As a result, a 
traditional proximate cause analysis would not hinder application of strict liability for 
these claims.
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 While the autonomy paradigm may not justify Cochran’s 
distinction between hedonistic and nonhedonistic products, his 
analysis of the distinction between consumers and bystanders is 
compelling. The question remains: When should bystanders be 
entitled to compensation even where no RAD is available? The most 
sweeping possibility is to impose strict liability against 
manufacturers for injuries to bystanders proximately caused by the 
inherent risks of their products. At first blush, the suggestion seems 
to tip the scales too far on the side of individual autonomy at the cost 
of utility. Yet enterprise liability has long explained that such a rule 
would not adversely impact the availability of socially useful but 
dangerous products. Even where liability is imposed, the 
manufacturer is not prohibited from continued use of the current 
design. The manufacturer simply compensates injured parties for 
their loss and can spread those costs among purchasers who benefit 
from the product’s utility. If the product is sufficiently useful, 
consumers will pay the high price and absorb the costs of the harm to 
nonusers. Strict liability, imposing compensatory damages rather 
than punitive damages or injunctive relief, should not restrict the 
supply of products that have social utility.
276
 However, the autonomy paradigm does not require strict liability 
for all injuries to bystanders caused by product designs. Such 
sweeping application is neither fair nor practical. Certain inherent 
dangers of commonly used products impose roughly reciprocal risks 
on all members of society. The dangers from commonly used products 
may be properly regarded as background risks that must be borne by 
all as the cost of community living in the same way that the 
background risks of other common activities must be borne by all 
members of society.
277
 When a bystander is injured by risks inherent 
in the design of a widely consumed product, it is fair to require that 
the plaintiff establish that the design was not reasonably safe rather 
than impose strict liability.  
 For example, all motor vehicles, as designed, create inherent risks 
as large, heavy, and fast-moving machines. Of course, if the 
pedestrian is a driver some of the time, he has implicitly consented to 
the risks associated with typical vehicle uses and imposes similar 
risks on other pedestrians when driving. The driver also benefits 
from the utility of motor vehicles as a class. Under such 
 276. Of course, this also fosters freedom in that it allows producers and consumers to 
have access to products they desire regardless of the dangers to themselves and others 
provided they are willing to pay the increased product price as a result of tort claims. The 
legislature, rather than the court, could step in and prohibit the production of products 
deemed to cause too much harm to bystanders despite the demand of consumers. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (suggesting the same with 
regard to “widely used and consumed, but nevertheless dangerous, products”).  
 277. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98. 
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circumstances it does not seem unfair to say that he has consented to 
the typical background risks of motor vehicle designs. On the other 
hand, where the plaintiff is injured by a specific motor vehicle design 
that is not reasonably safe as compared to a RAD, recovery is 
permitted under the Third Restatement.
 In some contexts, however, we may be able to determine that the 
dangers inherent in the design of a particular product create risks to 
bystanders grossly disproportionate to commonly used products such 
that strict liability should be imposed for injuries to bystanders. The 
designs of Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs), for example, impose risks on 
pedestrians and occupants of passenger cars vastly exceeding the 
risks imposed even by cars of similar weight.
278
 The dangers are most 
pronounced with the largest, heaviest, and highest-riding SUVs, such 
as the Ford Excursion, Hummer, and Chevrolet Suburban.
279
 The 
height differential between these SUVs and passenger cars results in 
the frame and protective structures of the SUVs overriding the frame 
and protective structures on the cars, resulting in massive damage to 
the passenger compartments.
280
 Arguably, these vehicles may be 
defectively designed from a risk-utility, RAD analysis, as most of 
these SUVs are used exclusively for highway use.
281
 But there may be 
no RAD that would eliminate the nonreciprocal risks of these 
vehicles where they are used both for off-road and highway use.
282
Yet the benefits enjoyed by these vehicle owners are not shared by 
the injured bystander who suffers injury proximately caused by the 
design’s risks. The autonomy paradigm would justify the imposition 
of liability without fault under these circumstances.  
 There undoubtedly are other consumer products that create clear 
hazards to bystanders that are greater than the risks of other, more 
commonly utilized designs. When a bystander is injured as a result of 
the danger created by these design characteristics, it is appropriate 
to impose liability on the product manufacturer in order to 
compensate that victim and ensure that the consumers who benefit 
from the product’s utility pay for the harm that they cause. This 
could be done on a case-by-case basis, as in the SUV example above. 
The plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that the product 
 278. See Kevin Case, Tanks in the Streets: SUVs, Design Defects, and Ultrahazardous 
Strict Liability, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 149-50 (2006); Latin & Kasolas, supra note 261, 
at 1162 (citing a National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration study that found 
that midsize SUVs were three times as likely to kill other motorists in a collision as 
passenger cars of approximately the same weight).  
 279. Latin & Kasolas, supra note 261, at 1212. 
 280. Id. at 1201-02. 
 281. See id. at 1216 (suggesting numerous alternative designs that would reduce the 
risks of override and urging the imposition of liability for injuries to bystanders under 
traditional defective design analysis). 
 282. But see id. (dismissing this argument primarily because the industry is aware that 
only a very small percentage of consumers truly drive off-road).  
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design creates risks greater than the normal background risks of 
typical product use as well as the plaintiff’s own product use.
283
 As in 
all tort claims, the plaintiff would also have to establish that the 
product design hazard was the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause 
of his injury. The fact that no RAD is available would not defeat 
liability. The focus would be on the disproportionate distribution 
of the risk compared to the benefits, not the unreasonableness of 
the design.  
 In order to limit liability to cases of clearly nonreciprocal risk 
imposition, it may be necessary to require that the plaintiff establish 
that the dangers to bystanders are vastly greater than background 
risks of typical product use. A razor’s edge analysis, where strict 
liability is imposed whenever the challenged design is slightly more 
dangerous to bystanders than the background risks of typical product 
design, would result in excessive litigation, undesirable transaction 
costs, and arbitrary outcomes.
284
 This could be avoided by requiring 
clear and convincing proof of significantly greater risks than the 
background risks created by normal product consumption.  
 In addition to, or as an alternative to, a case-by-case analysis, the 
autonomy paradigm justifies the imposition of strict liability for 
injured bystanders for two categories of products. First, strict 
liability should be imposed upon manufacturers for injuries to 
bystanders caused by abnormally dangerous products. A second, 
broader proposal imposes strict liability on manufacturers of 
commercial products for injuries to bystanders caused by the 
inherent risks of their products. In both instances, the products 
create nonreciprocal risks to bystanders without conveying any direct 
benefits on injured bystanders.  
A.  Abnormally Dangerous Products 
Professor John L. Diamond has suggested that traditional strict 
liability should be imposed upon manufacturers of abnormally 
dangerous products for the same reason that strict liability is 
imposed upon those who conduct abnormally dangerous activities.
285
Professor Diamond’s proposal, like Fletcher’s reciprocity paradigm, 
focuses on the foreseeable and unilateral nature of the risk rather 
 283. For example, if both the plaintiff and the defendant drove SUVs, it would not be 
fair to impose strict liability because the plaintiff also benefitted from the utility of the 
product design, even if not driving an SUV at the time of the injury.  
 284. See Keating, Reasonableness, supra note 22, at 330. Keating uses the term “razor’s 
edge” in a similar way when criticizing Judge Posner’s interpretation of the Learned Hand 
negligence formula. Id. In Keating’s view, Posner divides liability along a razor’s edge, 
“allowing a penny’s difference either way to tip the balance for or against a finding of 
negligence.” Id.
 285. John L. Diamond, Eliminating the “Defect” in Design Strict Products Liability 
Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 531 (1983). 
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than the reasonableness of the risk.
286
 The manufacture and use of 
products like dynamite are reasonable from a utilitarian analysis; 
they simply create an unusually high risk of harm. The manufacturer 
of products used in abnormally dangerous activities benefits from the 
unavoidable risks to others created by its products.
287
 Therefore, it is 
not unfair to require the manufacturers of the product, as well as the 
users, to compensate those inevitably injured by the product’s 
inherent risks. The manufacturer is in an ideal position to spread the 
cost of the injuries to all those who directly benefit from the product’s 
use, and imposing liability would encourage the manufacturer to 
distribute its product only to responsible users.
288
 In other words, the 
question is not whether the product design is defective but, in 
fairness, whether the manufacturer should pay for the foreseeable 
harm caused by its product.
289
 However, Diamond’s proposal, like the Third Restatement, makes 
no distinction between consumers and bystanders injured by 
abnormally dangerous products.
290
 Therefore, he ignores the users’ 
and consumers’ express or implicit consent to product risks in 
exchange for the benefits of the abnormally dangerous product’s 
utility. The benefits enjoyed by purchasers and consumers of these 
useful but dangerous products justify requiring them to establish the 
product design was defective by providing evidence of a RAD before 
the manufacturer must compensate them for their injuries. 
 It is necessary here to further define who is a bystander. The 
rationale for imposing strict liability is the injustice of suffering 
injury from risks deemed reasonable from a social utility cost-
benefits analysis, but from which the plaintiff does not directly 
receive the benefits of the product’s efficiency. Clearly, individual 
users and consumers implicitly consent to the risks of the products in 
exchange for the benefits such that liability should only be imposed 
under existing theories of recovery. The problem of determining who 
is the user or consumer of the product becomes more complex in the 
cases of business entities. Should employees of corporate consumers 
be deemed consumers or bystanders? 
 For a number of reasons, employees of corporations injured by 
products selected by their employer should not be treated as 
bystanders. First, they benefit from the utility of the abnormally 
dangerous product. They receive a salary and other benefits for their 
participation in an enterprise which, in turn, directly benefits from 
 286. Id. at 547-49. 
 287. Id. at 548. 
 288. Id.
 289. Id.
 290. Although Professor Diamond seeks to impose strict liability on manufacturers of 
abnormally dangerous products, he does not limit strict liability to bystanders. See id. at 550.  
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the use of the dangerous product.
291
 They have, at least implicitly, 
consented to the risk by choosing to work with the dangerous 
product. Finally, in the event that they are injured, they are partially 
compensated for their injuries under existing workers’ compensation 
schemes.
292
 Therefore, unlike the true strangers to the product, they 
are not left to bear all the cost of the socially beneficial activity.
293
 On the other hand, bystanders injured by abnormally dangerous 
products are exposed to nonreciprocal risks while not receiving any 
direct benefits in exchange for the product’s utility. As the term 
implies, abnormally dangerous products cannot be considered 
background risks that are associated with common consumer 
products. Imposing traditional strict liability upon manufacturers 
for bystanders injured by abnormally dangerous products like 
pesticides, explosives, toxic materials, and radioactive material would 
provide a clear, fair, and efficient exception to the RAD test of the 
Third Restatement.
B.  Commercial Products 
 The autonomy paradigm justifies an even broader categorical 
distinction for the application of strict liability for injuries to 
bystanders. Strict liability could be imposed for all injuries to 
 291. See Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1295. For similar reasons, Keating 
questions the fairness of providing employees the benefits of strict liability through 
workers’ compensation, while allowing strangers to the enterprise to recover only upon a 
showing of fault. Id. Enterprise liability holds that those who benefit from the enterprise 
should bear the costs of the harms it creates. Id. Employees benefit from the enterprise and 
voluntarily participate in it; strangers do not. Id.
 292. These rationales also justify workers’ compensation schemes’ failure to provide 
full tort damages including compensation for pain and suffering. The employee has 
benefited from the activity and has consented, at least on one level, to the risks where the 
bystander has not.  
 293. The same rationale supports a distinction between civilians and military service-
members in the application of the government contractor defense. The “government 
contractor defense” bars state law design defect claims by any injured person against 
government equipment manufacturers, provided that the design conformed to reasonably 
precise specifications approved by the United States. Unlike military members, civilians 
are not compensated though any military benefits or veterans’ benefits. In addition, 
civilians do not voluntarily agree to assume the risks of military activities as do the 
members of our all-volunteer military. The United States does not currently draft military 
members. Everyone in the military has volunteered to serve and presumably understands 
the risks associated with military service. In the absence of a civil suit, civilians may be left 
without any compensation for their injuries. While we all enjoy the benefits of our nation’s 
military superiority, the government contractor defense currently forces the injured 
civilian to bear a grossly disproportionate share of the costs of equipping the military. 
Allowing civilian suits might increase the cost of military equipment purchased by the 
government, but fairness requires that all taxpayers shoulder this burden, rather than the 
unfortunate injured civilian. See generally John L. Watts, Differences Without Distinctions: 
Boyle’s Government Contractor Defense Fails to Recognize the Critical Differences Between 
Civilian and Military Plaintiffs and Between Military and Non-Military Procurement, 60 
OKLA. L. REV. 647 (2007). 
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bystanders proximately caused by the inherent risks of commercial 
products while bystanders injured by the inherent risks of consumer 
products would have to recover under the Third Restatement’s RAD 
test. There are several rationales behind this distinction between 
consumer products and commercial products.  
 First, all persons use consumer products, while commercial 
products are used typically only by commercial enterprises. Although 
some consumer products produce greater risks to bystanders than 
others, all individual consumers subject bystanders to some risks 
associated with their product consumption.
294
 As a class, consumer 
products could fairly be regarded as background risks created by all 
and borne by all without compensation in the absence of fault as a 
cost of collective living.
295
 To the extent that a particular consumer 
product creates risks substantially greater than the typical risks of 
nearly universally consumed products, strict liability could be 
imposed on a case-by-case basis, as with the SUV example above.  
 Second, the distinction between commercial and consumer 
products is already recognized in products liability law and has 
proven to be a workable distinction that the courts can apply. The 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act distinguishes between consumer 
products and commercial products and defines consumer products as 
those that are “normally used for personal, family, or household 
purposes.”
296
 This definition is nicely suited to identifying background 
risks because it focuses on the nature of the product’s principle use 
rather than the specific purchaser’s intended use of the product.
297
The use of a typical passenger car by a commercial enterprise creates 
no risks for bystanders distinguishable from ordinary consumer use. 
However, regardless of whether a commercial product is used by a 
 294. For the reasons previously discussed, it would be impractical to fairly compare the 
risk of the users of one product against the user of the other. While the compact car driver 
may create less risk to the driver of the SUV in the event of a collision, the compact car 
driver assumed the risk of driving a small vehicle in exchange for the cost savings both in 
terms of initial purchase price and fuel savings. Yet the SUV might be less likely to be 
involved in an accident in the first instance because of its visibility to others and the high 
vantage point of its operator.  
 295. See Note, supra note 252, at 638-39. In discussing the application of strict liability 
to bystanders, the author made a similar point in responding to claims that compensating 
bystanders gives them a free ride at the cost of consumers: “Bystanders as a class purchase 
most of the same products to which they are exposed as bystanders. Thus as a class they 
indirectly subsidize the manufacturer’s liability and in this sense do pay for the insurance 
policy tied to the product.” Id.
 296. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (2006).  
 297. Compare U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) (2008) (distinguishing between consumer and 
commercial goods and stating that “ ‘[c]onsumer’ means an individual who buys or 
contracts to buy goods that, at the time of contracting, are intended by the individual to be 
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”), with 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) 
(focusing on the nature of the product’s principle use instead of the purchaser’s intended 
use of the product at the time of purchase). 
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business entity or an individual, the risks cannot be regarded as one 
created by all and fairly borne by all.  
 Utilitarian rationales supporting the distinction between 
consumer and commercial products in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act also support that distinction when imposing strict liability for 
injured bystanders. For consumer products, the Act nullifies 
warranty disclaimers in many instances notwithstanding contrary 
state law.
298
 On the other hand, commercial product sellers are 
allowed to disclaim warranties because the commercial product 
purchasers are thought to be better equipped to bargain for the 
allocation of risk. The Act permits commercial entities to waive 
warranty protection for two reasons. First, commercial product 
transactions typically involve large expenditures, either because of 
the quantity or because the product is itself expensive, even in 
comparison to costly consumer products.
299
 As a result, the 
commercial product purchaser may devote substantial resources into 
evaluation of product risks and utility that consumers typically do 
not.
300
 Large purchases also mean that commercial product 
purchasers are in a better bargaining position with the manufacturer 
regarding the design of the product and the warranty provided.
301
Moreover, commercial product consumers can negotiate for contractual 
contribution and indemnification provisions that are not possible in 
the typical consumer product transaction.
302
 Unlike commercial 
enterprises, consumer product purchasers are typically poorly 
informed as to the product’s design characteristics.
303
 The cost of most 
consumer products does not justify the time and effort required to 
evaluate the relative risks and utility of specific product designs.
304
 298. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (2006). The Uniform Commercial Code also defines consumer goods 
as goods “used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c). 
 299. Peter M. Kinkaid & William J. Stuntz, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability, 69 
VA. L. REV. 1111, 1150 n.162 (1983). 
 300. Id.
 301. A similar rationale has been used to bar design defect claims brought against 
government contractors where the government approved reasonably precise design 
specifications. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). The contractor 
shares the government’s immunity from suit under the discretionary function exception to 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006), because the design was selected, 
or at least approved, by the government. See id. at 211-12.  
 302. See Mark Geistfeld, Imperfect Information, the Pricing Mechanism, and Products 
Liability, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1071 (1988); Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299.  
 303. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 5.4; Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1286; 
Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299; see generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise 
Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 220-24 (2000) (discussing how manufacturer 
manipulation of consumers through advertising leads to consumers both underestimating 
and overestimating risk). 
 304. Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 140, at 
536 (consumers do not have perfect information because of the cost of obtaining it).  
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Therefore, purchasers of consumer products simply do not have the 
bargaining power that commercial product consumers enjoy.
305
 Second, corporations and other commercial entities do not face the 
risk of bodily injury that directly confronts individual consumer 
product purchasers.
306
 Employees may bleed, break bones, or develop 
cancer, but these harms are felt by the corporation only in terms of 
costs or lost productivity. Commercial entities view the risks of a 
product in purely economic terms and treat them no differently from 
other costs of doing business.
307
 As a result, commercial product users 
are less likely to either underestimate or overvalue the risks and 
benefits from an efficiency perspective. In other words, they are 
better able to determine whether the purchaser or the manufacturer 
should bear the risk of warranty waiver.
308
 Conversely, consumer 
product purchasers are notoriously irrational risk evaluators.
309
Unlike commercial entities, consumers are unlikely to regard 
personal injuries as just another cost. They often overestimate the 
probability of serious, but unlikely, risks. Other consumers 
overestimate their ability to avoid product risks; they assume that 
the injury won’t happen to them.
310
 As a result, imposing strict liability 
as to consumer products may not result in efficiency or safety.
311
 Accordingly, the basic rationales supporting enterprise liability 
also support the imposition of strict liability on the commercial 
product manufacturer for injuries to bystanders. First, fairness 
requires that the costs of accidents related to commercial enterprises 
should be borne by those that profit from the injury-causing 
activities.
312
 Second, enterprise liability would allow the marketplace 
 305. See Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299, at 1152. 
 306. See id.
 307. See id.
 308. See id. at 1150 n.162. 
 309. See id. But see Landes & Posner, supra note 140, at 536-37 (performing an 
economic analysis of products liability but refusing to “assume that consumers have 
psychological traits that cause them to misperceive risks systematically”).  
 310. See Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299, at 1151 n.162; see also Henderson & 
Rachlinski, supra note 303; Kysar, supra note 24 (discussing how cognitive errors, 
irrationality, and perhaps an alternative rationality of consumers impacts their 
evaluations of product risks and benefits in ways not accounted for by the Third 
Restatement’s test). 
 311. Where a consumer product creates simply too much risk to bystanders, the state 
legislatures should prohibit the product’s distribution rather than merely awarding 
compensation. Monetary compensation is an imperfect remedy for someone who has 
suffered a serious loss of autonomy, due to physical injury, where the product does not 
advance important collective welfare objectives.  
 312. This is one of the fundamental rationales behind vicarious liability and 
Workmen’s Compensation Acts. Yet, from a pure enterprise liability perspective, 
respondeat superior liability should not be limited to injuries caused by the “fault” of 
servants. Moreover, bystanders injured by the enterprise are more deserving of 
compensation than workers who have voluntarily participated in the enterprise and 
directly benefited from it. Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1295. 
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to determine which activities’ benefits are sufficient to justify the 
harms. If the enterprise can pay for the injuries it causes and still 
remain profitable, it must produce benefits that outweigh its costs 
(including injuries to bystanders).
313
 Because both the manufacturers 
of commercial products and the purchasers of these products are 
commercial entities, the decisions of both are motivated by financial 
concerns. Commercial product manufacturers and commercial 
product consumers will only seek to reduce harms if they must 
absorb the costs of injuries. Accordingly, they should be required to 
pay for the harm to innocent bystanders caused by their products.
314
These costs, when considered by commercial profit-maximizing 
rational actors, will not result in a loss of utility but will result in a 
more accurate market determination of efficiency.
315
 If the product’s 
utility does outweigh the risks, manufacturers can compensate 
bystanders injured by the product’s dangers and distribute the costs 
to those that purchase the products and benefit from the utility of the 
design features that harmed the plaintiff. On the other hand, the 
internalization of cost associated with product harms to bystanders 
will cause commercial product purchasers to demand safer products 
when the costs do not outweigh the product’s utility.  
 Finally, the distinction between consumer and commercial goods 
furthers individual liberty to freely engage in consumer product 
consumption and provides a workable system for the courts and 
parties to apply. We all engage in the consumption of products that 
impose risks on bystanders, and we all enjoy the benefits of these 
products. In theory, individual autonomy could be protected by 
imposing liability whenever the product that causes harm to the 
bystander is not a class of products that the bystander also utilizes. 
Such a rule, however, would result in prohibitive litigation and seems 
unnecessary provided that the bystander exposes others to roughly 
similar risks through the products he or she uses.
316
 The distinction 
between commercial products and consumer products will allow for 
predictability among manufacturers regarding which products will 
expose them to strict liability for bystander injuries, without endless, 
expensive, and in some cases, impossible factual inquires.    
VII.  CONCLUSION
 Tort law has long struggled with finding the proper balance 
between protecting individual rights and furthering social utility. 
The deontological approach of emphasizing the intrinsic worth of a 
 313. Cochran, Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 697-98. 
 314. Id.
 315. Id.
 316. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 572 (noting the difficulty in 
comparing the risks of common yet diverse activities). 
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particular action is fundamentally incompatible with the 
consequentialist perspective of judging an action by whether it 
creates the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Like 
purebred show dogs, these two approaches function best in artificial, 
controlled conditions—such as the hypotheticals presented by their 
proponents. In practice, however, each approach, emphasized to the 
exclusion of the other, leads to undesirable results. In the real world, 
the law has long sought to combine their most useful traits and 
eliminate or counteract their weaknesses.  
 Numerous scholars have been critical of the Third Restatement’s 
abandonment of the consumer expectation test as a retreat from the 
individual fairness goals of strict product liability.
317
 Yet, to 
paraphrase Marc Antony from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, I have 
come to praise the Third Restatement, not to bury it.
318
 Careful 
analysis through the application of the autonomy paradigm and the 
reasonableness paradigm demonstrates that, in most respects, the 
Third Restatement strikes both a fair and reasonable balance 
between individual justice and social utility. It is only in its 
application of the reasonable alternative design test to bystanders 
that the scales of justice have been unfairly tipped in favor of utility.  
 Commenting upon the development of the Third Restatement,
Professor Henderson noted that twenty years from now lawyers will 
look back and wonder how we could have missed some issue that 
seems obvious in hindsight.
319
 Viewed through the autonomy paradigm, 
the Third Restatement’s failure to provide a distinct category of strict 
liability for bystanders injured by inherent risks of abnormally 
dangerous and commercial products is that obvious oversight.  
 This Article identifies areas where fairness demands that strict 
liability be imposed. There is room for experimentation among the 
fifty jurisdictions applying product liability law so that, over time, 
the laboratories of democracy might settle on the best option.
320
 The 
current reasonable alternative design test, as applied to inherently 
dangerous but useful product designs, simply exacts too high a price 
on injured bystanders for the sake of efficiency and utility. Injured 
 317. See sources cited supra note 24. 
 318. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2. After Caesar’s murder at the 
hand of Brutus, Mark Antony addresses the crowed with the famous line: “Friends, 
Romans, countrymen, . . . I [have] come to bury Caesar, not . . . praise him.” Id. Antony 
then extorts a long list of Caesar’s most positive qualities. See id.
 319. James A. Henderson Jr., A Discussion and a Defense of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 18, 21 (1998). 
 320. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. 
dissenting) (cautioning against the use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause 
as a tool for second guessing legislative efforts at economic regulations). “It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.” Id.
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bystanders must not be used as a means to achieve a socially 
beneficial end. Torts suits are private disputes involving real 
individuals who have suffered real harms. If courts are to remain 
courts of justice and not simply engines for efficiency, they must 
weigh the relationship of the injured party to the product when 
determining liability.  
